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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Crop Insurance-Adequacy of Notice
In a recent United States Supreme Court case1 the plaintiff, an
Idaho farmer, sued the Federal. Crop Insurance Corporation2 to recover
1 Federal Corp. Ins. Corporation v. Merrill,--U. S.-, 68 Sup. Ct. 1, 92 L. Ed.
51 (1947), reversing 174 P. 2d 834 (Idaho 1946).
252 STAT. 72 (1938), 7 U. S. C. §1503 (1940).
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for the destruction of his spring wheat crop by drought. In applying
for the insurance the plaintiff had informed the Corporation's local
agent that he was reseeding 400 acres of his spring wheat on winter
wheat acreage, and the agent had advised him that his entire crop was
insurable. After the drought the Federal Crop Insurance Corpora-
tion.refused to pay the loss because, prior to the plaintiff's application,
the Corporation had promulgated its Wheat Crop Insurance Regula-
tions which were duly published in the Federal'Register. 3 The regula-
tions stated that spring wheat which had been reseeded on winter wheat
was not insurable. The Court held in a five to four decision that the
plaintiff could not recover.
The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation is expressly given the
power to sue and be sued.4 If this had meant that the Corporation was
to be held subject to the same rules of liability as private insurance com-
panies, then it would have been liable in this case. Under the insurance
law of Idaho, and the majority of states6 the knowledge of the agent
is the knowledge of the company and his representations in a situation
like the present one would bind the company. However, the Court did
not apply this rule because to have done so would have been to ignore
the regulations promulgated by the Corporation and published in the
Federal Register.
Prior to the Federal Register Act of 19357 there was no uniform
or systematic method of publicizing executive orders or administrative
regulations. The great confusion that this led to was strikingly empha-
sized in the case of Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan5 where the case was
argued through two lower courts upon the assumption that the Petro-
leum Code contained a paragraph which in fact had been eliminated'by
executive order. To correct this difficulty an act was passed requiring
all executive orders and administrative regulations 9 of general applica-
'Wheat Crop Insurance Regulations 414-37(v), 10 FE. Rwo. 1591 (1945).
'52 STAT. 73 (1938), 7 U. S. C. §1506(d) (1940). This section provides that
the Federal Crop Insurance Corp. shall not be subject to garnishment, attachment,
or injunction.
aMaybee v. Continental Casualty Co., 37 Idaho 667, 219 Pac. 598 (1923);
Carroll v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 28 Idaho 466, 154 Pac. 985 (1916).
E. g., Triple Link Mutual Indemnity Ass'n v. Williams, 121 Ala. 138, 26 So.
19 (1899); Commercial Credit Co. v. Eisenhour, 28 Ariz. 112, 236 Pac. 126
(1925) ; Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Moore, 154 Ky. 18, 156 S. W. 867 (1913) ;
Crossman v. American Ins. Co. of Newark, N. J., 198 Mich. 304, 164 N. W. 428
(1917) ; Cox v. Assurance Society, 209 N. C. 778, 185 S. E. 12 (1936) ; Steuer-
nagel v. Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum, 234 N. Y. 251, 137 N. E. 320 (1922).
749 STAT. 500 (1935), 44 U. S. C. §§301-314 (1940).8293 U. S. 388, 412 (1935).
O Section 5 of the Federal Register Act requires specifically the publication of
presidential proclamations and executive orders, such other documents as the presi-
dent may determine, and such documents as Congress may determine. Under this
section the president issues regulations requiring the rules of administrative agen-
cies to be published. See Ronald, Publication of Federal Administrative Legiska-
lion, 7 GEo. W. L. REv. 51, 71 (1938). The Federal Administrative Procedure
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bility and legal effect to be published in the Federal Register. Accord-
ing to the Act filing of the regulation with the Division of the National
Archives Establishment is sufficient to give notice of its contents to the
public. 10 The cases'1 involving the point have held, with one excep-
tion,' 2 that publication in the Federal Register does give notice to in-
terested parties. Thus the Court in the principal case held that publi-
cation of the Corporation's regulations in the Federal Register gave legal
notice of their contents, and they were binding on the plaintiff though
neither he nor the Corporation's local agent had actual knowledge of
them.
The question then arises as to whether a government corporation
which engages in commercial activity should be held subject to the same
rules of law as to its liability as a private corporation similarly situated.
As a matter of public policy a strong argument can be made that it
should not. Government corporations are not on the same basis as
private ones in that their purpose is not to make profit but rather to
procure benefits which inure to the public generally. In the principal
case, for instance, it was pointed out that all-risk crop insurance had
been too great a commercial hazard for private insurance companies, so
the government entered the field to give the farmers much needed
protection.' 3
However, the benefits which the government corporations are giving
the public would seem to be somewhat illusory when these corporations
are allowed to escape liability in situations where private corporations
would be held. Such cases may tend to create distrust of government
corporations. The courts have tended, in the absence of express con-
Act, 60 STAT. 238 (1946), 5 U. S. C. AiP. §1002(a) (Supp. 1947), supplements
this and requires all substantive rules and statements of policy of administrative
agencies to be published in the Federal Register.
10 Publication in the Federal Register would seem to afford interested persons
substantially the same opportunity to acquaint themselves with pertinent adminis-
trative regulation as they would have to acquaint themselves with pertinent statutes
passed by Congress. However, to the effect that even lawyers seldom have access
to or know how to use the Federal Register, see Wigmore, The Federal Register
and Code of Federal Regulations, 29 A. B. A. Joui. 10 (1943); 22 MicH. ST. B.
Joup. 23 (1943).1
' Flannagan v. United States, 145 F. 2d 740 (C. C. A. 9th 1944) ; Henderson
v. Baldwin, 54 F. Supp. 438 (D. C. Pa. 1942); Henderson v. Nixon, 66 Idaho
780, 168 P. 2d 594 (1946).
"2 Hall v. Chaltis, 31 A. 2d 699 (D. C. Mun. App. 1943). In this case it was
held that a price regulation filed two days before and published on the day that
defendant made the sale at a price above that required by the regulation did not
give sufficient notice to defendant to render him liable to a $5D penalty. A con-
curring opinion said of the Federal Register, "I think we can take judicial notice
that the average shopkeeper does not see that publication and probably is unaware
that such a publication exists."
I See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CROP
INSURANcE, H. Doc. No. 150, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4, 11-12; H. RE'. No. 1479,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2; 81 CoNG. R= 2866, 2867, 2887, 2891, 2893, 2895 (1937).
[Vol. 26
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gressional intent to the contrary, to treat them as private corporations.14
This view was well stated in United States v. Thomas15 where the court
said, "In commercial transactions the Government should require of no
citizen adherence to a rule between men that it is unwilling to follow."
Examples of the courts denying government corporations 18 the
privileges and immunities usually afforded the Government itself are
numerous. Thus government corporations may be sued without their
consent1 7 even where Congress has not authorized suit against them.' s
They are liable for interest' 9 and court costs.2 0 Their actions have
been held to be barred by statutes of limitations and laches. 21 It has
1" Thurston, Government Proprietary Corporations, 21 VA. L. Ray. 465, 503
(1935), where the author says "in the law of government proprietary corporations
the public interest is best served by regarding them as private."1 27 F. Supp. 433 (N. D. Tex. 1939).
10 There are two principal types of government corporations, those which are
incorporated directly by an act of Congress and those which are incorporated
under the law of some state pursuant to an act of Congress. However, it is be-
lieved that the general principles applicable to one are applicable to the other. For
an opinion that there is no distinction to be drawn between the two types see,
Coffman, Legal Status of Government Corporations, 7 FED. B. J. 389 n.* (1936).
The Government Corporations Control Act, 59 STAT. 597, 602 (1945), 31 U. S. C.
App. §869 (Supp. 1947) provides that government corporations must be created
directly by act of Congress and any existing corporations chartered under state
law must be reincorporated by act of Congress before June 30, 1948.
1' Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 306 U. S. 381
(1939); Olson v. United States Spruce Production Corporation, 267 U. S. 462
(1925); Sloan Shipping Corp. v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet
Corporation, 258 U. S. 549 (1922) ; Federal Sugar Refining Co. v. United States
Sugar Eq. Board, 268 Fed. 575 (S. D. N. Y. 1920) ; cf. Bank of the United States
v. Planter's Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheat. 904 (U. S. 1824).
18 In creating corporations Congress has almost uniformly included "sue and be
sued" clauses. E.g., Farmer's Home Corporation, 50 STAT. 527 (1937), 7 U. S. C.
§1014 (1940); Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, 48 STAT. 1246,
1256 (1934), 12 U. S. C. § 1725 (1940); Home Owner's Loan Corporation, 48
STAT. 128, 129 (1933), 12 U. S. C. §1463 (1940) ; Tennessee Valley Authority, 48
STAT. 58, 60 (1933), 16 U. S. C. §831 (1940) ; Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
47 STAT. 5, 6 (1932), 15 U. S. C. §604 (1940); Inland Waterways Corporation,
43 STAT. 360, 362 (1924), 49 U. S. C. §155 (1940) ; National Agricultural Credit
Corporation, 42 STAT. 1454, 1462 (1923), 12 U. S. C. §1171 (1940) ; Foreign Bank-
ing Corporations, 41 STAT. 378 (1919), 12 U. S. C. §614 (1940).
" Utlited States v. The Thekla, 266 U. S. 328 (1924); National Home For
Disabled Volunteer Soldiers v. Parrish, 229 U. S. 494 (1913) ; accord, Standard
Oil Company v. United States, 267 U. S. 76 (1925) (interest allowed against
United States on a policy of war risk insurance, though not administered by a
government corporation. The court, per Holmes, said, "When the United States
went into the insurance business, issued policies in familiar form and provided that
in case of disagreement it might be sued, it must be assumed to have accepted the
ordinary incidents of suits in such business.").
-o Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. J. G. Menihan Corp., 312 U. S. 81
(1941); see Walling v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 162 F. 2d 95, 97 (C. C. A. 4th
1947).
" Lindgren v. United States Shipping Board Merchant Fleet Corp., 55 F. 2d
117 (C. C. A. 4th 1932) ; The No. 34, 11 F. 2d 287 (C. C. A. 2d 1925) ; Bank of
the United States v. McKenzie, 2 Fed. Cas. 718, No. 927 (C. C. Va. 1829) ; see
United States v. Morse, 26 F. Supp. 341, 342 (S. D. Me. 1939). But cf. Davis
v. Corona Coal Co., 265 U. S. 219 (1924).
1948]
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been held that government corporations can be estopped.22 They are
liable for their torts.23 Some courts have held that they are subject to
garnishment and attachment.2 4
In holding government corporations liable in situations where the
Government itself would be immune, many courts merely say that the
corporation is a separate and distinct entity2-5 or that the Government
in becoming a corporation and descending to the level of the business
world divests itself of its sovereignty.20 The more recent view on
liability is that it is a matter of congressional intent.27 Congress may
clothe the corporation with the Government's immunity.2 8 Whether
or not it has done so must be determined by considering the statute
creating the corporation and the nature and purposes of the corporation
created.29
Thus the question in the principal case would be: did Congress
intend the law of private insurance companies to be bodily applicable
to the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation? That Congress authorized
the Government to enter into a commercial field, that it chose a corporate
form to administer the insurance,3 0 and that it gave it power to sue
2' Providence Engineering Corporation v. Downey Shipbuilding Corporation, 294
Fed. 641 (C. C. A. 2d 1923); see The Falcon, 19 F. 2d 1009, 1014 (D. C. Md.
1927) ; cf. Cushman v. United States, 43 F. Supp. 810 (S. D. Cal. 1942).
23Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 306 U. S. 381
(1939) ; Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375 (1924) ; Sloan Shipyard
Corp. v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, 258 U. S.
549 (1922); Federal Sugar Refining Co. v. United States Sugar Equalization
Board, 268 Fed. 575 (S. D. N. Y. 1920).
24 Federal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U. S. 229 (1935) ; Commonwealth Finance
Corporation v. Landis, 261 Fed. 440 (E. D. Pa. 1919) ; Central Market v. King, 132
Neb. 380, 272 N. W. 244 (1937) ; Gill v. Reese, 53 Ohio App. 134, 4 N. E. 2d 273
(1936) ; Haines v. Lone Star Shipbuilding Co., 268 Pa. 92, 110 At. 788 (1920) ;
cf. Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U. S. 242 (1939). Contra:
McCarthy v. United States Shipping Board Merchant Fleet Corporation, 53 F. 2d
923 (App. D. C. 1931); Home Owners' Loan Corporation v. Hardie & Caudle,
171 Tenn. 43, 100 S. W. 2d 238 (1936).2 See, e.g., Olson v. United States Spruce Production Corporation, 267 U. S.
462, 467 (1924) ; National Home For Disabled Volunteer Soldiers v. Parrish, 229
U. S. 494, 496 (1913) ; Bank of the United States v. Planter's Bank of .Georgia,
9 Wheat. 904, 907 (U. S. 1824) ; Lindgren v. United States Shipping Board Mer-
chant Fleet Corporation, 55 F. 2d 117, 120 (C. C. A. 4th 1932).
"0 Bank of the United States v. Planters Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheat. 904, 907
(U. S. 1824).
' Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. J. G. Menihan Corp., 312 U. S. 81
(1941) ; Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 306 U. S. 381
(1939); Federal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U. S. 229 (1935); Sloan Shipyard
Corporation v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, 258
U. S. 549 (1922); cf. Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U. S. 242
(1959).
" See Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. J. G. Menihan Corp., 312 U. S.
81, 84 (1941) ; Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 306 U. S.
381, 389 (1939) ; Federal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U. S. 229, 231 (1935).
" See note 27 supra.
" Not all government insurance is handled by government corporations. Na-
tional Service Life Insurance is administered by the Administrator of Veterans'
Affairs and payment is made from a fund in the Treasury. 54 STAT. 1008, 1012
[Vol. 26
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and be sued would seem to indicate that it intended the Corporation to
be subject to the same rules.of law as private insurance companies. The
Supreme Court could have avoided the effect of the Corporation's Wheat
Crop Insurance Regulations in the same manner as did the Idaho Su-
preme Court.3 ' That court said that Congress did not intend such regu-
lations to be binding law but merely rules for the Corporation's own
guidance and for the guidance of its agents. However, the Court did
not find that Congress intended the law of private insurance companies
to be applicable to the Corporation.
In the future, if goyernment corporations which are engaging in
commercial activities are to be held amenable-to the same rules of law
as private corporations -Congress must clearly manifest that intention
in the statutes creating them.
WILLrAM T. JOYNER, JR.
Adoption-Invalidation for Want of Consent
In Allen v. Morgan,' the Court of Appeals of Georgia upheld the
action of the trial court in denying plaintiff's petition for adoption of
defendants' child, and vacating the interlocutory order of adoption
granted eight months prior to entry'of the judgment.
The defendants were married after conception but before birth of
the child. On learning of this the husband's step-mother began to
apply pressure to have the child adopted. The defendants testified that
the step-mother "suggested" that the mother go to a waiting home and
put the child out for adoption, in order that the step-mother could hold
*up both "her head" and "her social standing." One month after its
birth they took the child to Saluda, North Carolina and left it in the
care of a doctor, until the defendants "could get situated." Three days
later the defendants signed the consent, "because of the constant pres-
sure being put on us day and night." The plaintiffs were residents of
Georgia and were qualified in every way to become adoptive parents.
Neither they nor their attorney had knowledge of any coercion that
might have been practiced on the defendants.
The court, in construing the statute2 requiring consent of the natu-
ral parents, held that both the letter and spirit of the statute gives the
court, "full and unrestricted power to examine into the nature and kind
of consent by parents to an adoption, not only because it is absolutely
(1940), 38 U. S. C. §§801, 805 (1940). The War Risk Insurance of the First
World War was administered by the Bureau of War Risk Insurance in the Treas-
ury Department. 40 STAr. 398 (1917).
"Merrill v. Federal Crop Ins. Corporation, 174 P. 2d 834 (Idaho 1946).
144 S. E. 2d 500 (Ga. 1947).
2GA. CODE ANN. (Harrison, 1937) §74-403 (Supp. 1945) "... no adoption
shall be permitted except with the written consent of the living parents of the
child,.. :'
19481
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prerequisite to the validity of an order granting a prayer for adoption,
but because the wisdom of the grant, the welfare of the child and of
the other parties, as well as the public policy of the State is involved."
With the exception of Maryland,3 the states uniformly require the
consent of the natural parent or parents to give validity to an adoption,
absent special circumstances such as abandonment. Prior to 1941,
North Carolina required that the consent be given to the specific adop-
tion,4 but in 1941 an amendment was added to the statute, overruling
these decisions. 5
There is a wide divergence of opinion as to whether or not consent,
voluntarily given, may be arbitrarily withdrawn at any time before
entry of the final decree. 6 Some courts refuse to grant the final order
of adoption over the objection of the natural parents, even though they
had previously consented to it.7 It may be stated generally that this
view emanates from the now outmoded doctrine of strictly construing
adoption statutes in favor of the rights of the natural parents.
Conversely, many tribunals have denied the right to revoke and
have based such denials on: (1) principles of contract;8 (2) estoppel
or other equitable grounds ;9 (3) public policy favoring the adoption of
children, particularly illegitimates ;1o (4) welfare of the child.1"
Analysis of these cases discloses that though the courts speak in
terms of contract, estoppel, public policy and welfare of the child, much
depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Indeed,
at least one court12 has announced this to be the rule. Accordingly,
parents were allowed to revoke13 shortly after execution of their consent
and before entry of the final decree, and before adoptive parents had
'Adoption of Lagumis, 46 A. 2d 189 (Md. 1946) ("The Maryland statute
differs from that of most of the states in not requiring the consent of the parents
in any case .... ).
'Hanft, Thwarting Adoptions, 19 N. C. L. Rxv. 127, 143 (1941).
N. C. GEN STAT. (1943) §48-5: ". . . and no further consent of the parent,
parents, or guardian to a subsequent specific adoption shall be necessary. . ."
6N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §48-5 provides among other things that where the
child has been surrendered to a licensed child-placing agency or to the Superin-
tendent of Public Welfare of the County, the attending consent is irrevocable.
Where surrendered to others for adoption, the attending consent becomes irrev-
ocable after six months.
' In re McDonnell's Adoption, 176 P. 2d 153 (Cal. 1947) ; In re White's Adop-
tion, 300 Mich. 378, 1 N. W. 2d 579 (1942) ; Platzer v. Beardsley, 149 Minn. 435,
183 N. W. 956 (1921); Wright v. Fitzgibbons, 198 Miss. 471, 21 So. 2d 709
(1945); Application of Graham, 199 S. W. 2d 68 (Mo. 1947); Adoption of
Caparelli, 175 P. 2d 153 (Ore. 1946) ; In re Nebns, 153 Wash. 242, 279 Pac. 748
(1929) ; see Allen v. Morgan, 44 S. E. 2d 500, 506 (Ga. 1947).I Durden v. Johnson, 194 Ga. 689, 22 S. E. 2d 514 (1942) ; Stanford v. Gray,
42 Utah 228, 129 Pac. 423 (1913).9 Wyness v. Crowley, 292 Mass. 459, 198 N. E. 758 (1935).
0 In re Adoption of a Minor, 144 F. 2d 644 (App. D. C. 1944); Ex parte
Schultz, 181 P. 2d 585 (Nev. 1947).
"Lee v. Thomas, 297 Ky. 858, 181, S. W. 2d 457 (1944).
"Hammond v. Chadwick, 199 S. W. 2d 547 (Tex. 1947).
Id.
[Vol. 26
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custody of the child for a considerable time and had spent much money
on it.14 On the other hand, the right to revoke was denied where the
fully qualified adoptive parents took custody of the child and devoted
time and money toward carrying out their duty as foster parents for
fifteen months without objection from the consenting mother.15
The extreme on this point was reached by the Court of Appeals of
the District of Columbia in the case of In re Adoption of a Minor.'"
Basing its decision on the public policy of Congress in maintaining the
new relationship, the court held that consent of the mother given two
months before birth of the child was valid and irrevocable. Though on
its face the decision was based on congressional policy, with a hint at
estoppel, 17 the facts of the particular case seemed to control the out-
come. These facts were that the adoptive parents had taken custody,
that the court had acted on the consent that the attempt to revoke came
two months after birth, the illegitimacy of the child, and the qualifica-
tions of the adoptive parents to rear the child.18
There is a definite trend toward denial of the right arbitrarily to
revoke consent that is voluntarily given. These decisions are parallel
to, and grow out of, the trend toward a more liberal construction of
adoption statutes with a view toward maintaining the new status of the
child.' 9
The decided cases establish the proposition that the decree of adop-
tion may be set aside for: (1) fraud practiced on the court;20 (2) undue
influence practiced on the adopting parent by the natural parent;21 (3)
undue influence practiced by the adoptee ;22 (4) gaining of the consent
"'Accord, Skaggs v. Gannon, 293 Ky. 795, 170 S. W. 2d 12 (1943) (where
suffident reason is shown, mother may revoke consent within sixty days allowed
for appeal from the adoption order).
" Lee v. Thomas, 297 Ky. 858, 181 S. W. 2d 457 (1944).
" 144 F. 2d 644 (App. D. C. 1944).
" Id. at 651. Consent was irrevocable, "... especially after having been pre-
sented to the court and acted upon by the appellants who were . . . innocent
strangers who acted in good faith."
"8 A different construction of the case-i.e. consent given before birth is irrev-
ocable regardless of the peculiar facts of the case-would lead to an extremely
harsh result. There can be no reason to cause a mother to face the ordeal of
giving birth to a child which she knows she cannot keep, just because she erred in
giving her consent, possibly in one of the trying moments that often accompany
pregnancy, which she now wishes to withdraw. It is difficult to believe that Con-
gress intended its policy to be so far reaching.
It also seems that a good argument against such a rule could be made on the
basis of public policy.
' Compare Ex parte Schultz, 181 P. 2d 585 (Nev. 1947), with Platzer v.
Beardsley, 149 Minn. 435, 183 N. W. 956 (1921); Application of Graham, 199
S. W. 2d 68 (Mo. 1947).
"0 Platt v. Magagnini, 110 Cal. 699, 251 Pac. 205 (1920) (defendants adopted
the child while knowing it could not live, in order to inherit from it) ; Stevens v.
Halstead, 168 N. Y. S. 142, 181 App. Div. 198 (1917) (adult woman lived in
adultery with an aged man in order to induce him to adopt her).
Phillips v. Chase, 203 Mass. 556, 89 N. E. 1049 (1909).Greene v. Fitzpatrick, 220 Ky. 590, 295 S. W. 896 (1927).
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of the natural parents by the use of fraud or undue influence ;23 and
(5) such grounds as would entitle the court to vacate any other order
or decree. 24
No cases are found which distinguish between fraud and undue
influence which is practiced by the adoptive parents and that practiced
by third persons. In Lambert v. Taylor2 5 there was fraud in the factum
of the written consent. Fraud was induced by persons in the natural
father's family, but there was no showing of participation by the adop-
tive parents. The court set aside the decree, reciting the usual rule as
to fraud.26
To set aside an adoption decree on the ground that the natural
parents' consent thereto was due to mistake or fraud, such mistake or
fraud must have been with respect to an existing fact, rather than a
mere matter of opinion or belief as to something to happen in the future,
regardless of how greatly such matter influenced the giving of the con-
sent.2 7  Likewise, "undue influence," such as will warrant setting the
adoption aside means that the person exercising the influence so far
dominated the will of the other as to substitute his will for such other,
so that his act is in reality the act of the person exercising the influ-
ence.2 8 Accordingly,'it was held that advice of doctors, made in good
faith, that the plaintiff would not survive her case of tuberculosis was
not fraud.29 Duress was not established by showing that the consent
was given due to the "irresistible pressure of the circumstances" and
plaintiff's "mental condition" caused by her husband's refusal to sup-
port her and threats of leaving her after learning that she was the
mother of an illegitimate child.30 The same result was reached where
the plaintiff was "put to shame" and "great emotional tension" as a
result of pleas of her brother that she put her illegitimate child out for
adoption.3 1
It appears, therefore, that the instant case is not only against the
weight of authority on this point, but is patently wrong.3 2 This fact situ-
ation, from which the court found duress, is the rule rather than the ex-
3 Lambert v. Taylor, 150 Fla. 680, 8 So. 2d 159 (1942).
2, State ex rel Bradshaw v. Probate Court of Marion County, 73 N. E. 2d 769
(Ind. 1947).
" 150 Fla. 680, 8 So. 2d 159 (1942). (The result of this case is indefensible
because there was a delay of five years in bringing the suit. The court noted the
laches but cast it aside because no such issue was properly presented. These
adoptive parents, who spent their money, love, and affection on the child for five
years, cannot regard very highly the "justice" of such a harsh penalty for their
unfortunate choice of attorneys.).
20 Decree may be set aside for fraud.2 7Nealon v. Farris, 131 S. W. 2d 858 (Mo. 1939).
.
8 Phillips v. Chase, 203 Mass. 556, 89 N. E. 1049 (1909).2 0Nealon v. Farris, 131 S. W. 2d 858 (Mo. 1939).
20 Stanford v. Gray, 42 Utah 228, 129 Pac. 423 (1913).
"Adoption of Caparelli, 175 P. 2d 153 (Ore. 1946).
2 But see Westendorf v. Westendorf, 187 Iowa 659, 174 N. W. 359 (1919).
(Vol. 26
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ception. In the case of illegitimacy there is likely to be someone in the
mother's family applying pressure on her to have the child adopted so
that the family can "hold up their heads." Let such "duress" be valid
grounds for setting aside the adoption-add to this the fact that the ma-
jority of adoptees are illegitimate3 3-and the result is that a substantial
percentage of adoptions have been undermined. Knowing of this deci-
sion, all the mother who has change4 her mind has to do, to have a per-
fectly valid adoption set aside, is to have a relative come into court and
tell how he or she put the mother to great shame by showing her what a
disgrace the illegitimate child was going to be and "suggesting" that
she put it out for adoption.
The decision completely ignores the fact that the plaintiffs are per-
fectly innocent third persons who had nothing to do with the "duress,"
and who, in good faith, put forth their money, love and affection only
to be forced to stand by and watch their efforts go up in the "smoke"
of a family squabble with which they were not concerned.
The case seems to be another product of the outworn theory that
adoption statutes, being in derogation of the common law and the par-
ents' natural rights, should be strictly construed. 34 This theory was
announced by the court.35 The more modern view recognizes the fact
that such legislation is not intended to supplement the common law, but
completely to supplant it. Accordingly, it is held that the statutes should
be construed liberally, to the end that the adoption may be upheld and
the assumed relation sustained.3 6
The North Carolina decisions, prior to 1943, are based on the strict
view,37 and resulted in the wholesale thwarting of adoptions.3 & Then
came the case of Locke v. Merrick3 9 wherein Mr. Justice Schenck,
quoted from40 and cited with approval the case of McConnell v. McCon-
nell,41 which is a leading case for the liberal view. Due to the high
degree of success and the social desirability of adoption as compared to
" Hanft, Thwarting Adoptions, 19 N. C. L. REv. 127, 131 (1941).
" Smith v. Smith, 180 P. 2d 853 (Idaho 1947) ; Application of Graham et al,
199 S. W. 2d 68 (Mo. 1947); Adoption of Caparelli, 175 P. 2d 153 (Ore. 1946).
"44 S. E. 2d 500, 506 (Ga. 1947).
In re Adoption of a Minor, 144 F. 2d 644 (App. D. C. 1944) ; McConnell v.
McConnell, 345 Ill. 70, 177 N. E. 692 (1931); Seibert v. Seibert, 170 Iowa 561,
153 N. W. 160 (1915) ; Ex parte Schultz, 181 P. 2d 585 (Nev. 1947) ; Locke v.
Merrick, 223 N. C. 799, 22 S. E. 2d 523 (1943).
17 Ward v. Howard, 217 N. C. 799, 7 S. E. 2d 625 (1940).
Hanft, Thwarting Adoptions, 19 N. C. L. REv. 127 (1941).
"223 N. C. 799, 22 S. E. 2d 523 (1943).
,0 Id. at 803 ". .. it is well to remember that since the right of adoption is not
only beneficial to those immediately concerned but, likewise, to the public, con-
struction of the statute should not be narrow or technical nor compliance therewith
examined with a judicial microscope in order that every slight defect may be
magnified . . . ." The value of the case as a precedent is questionable because
no mention was made of the previous North Carolina cases, and the decision would
likely have been the same under the strict view.
4-345 Ill. 70, 177 N. E. 692 (1931).
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institutions or leaving children with unfit parents,42 the liberal view is
the more desirable one, and it is to be hoped that our court will follow
the attitude expressed in the Locke case.43
Because the law of North Carolina thwarted adoptions instead of
furthering them, necessary changes were made in the statute in 1941. 4 4
The statute was made cumbersome by this patchwork, therefore in 1947
a complete revision of the old statute was passed for the purpose of
organization and clarification.45 Because the enacting clause was
omitted, however, the North Carolina Supreme court held that the at-
tempted enactment is entirely null and void.46 This statute expressly
embodied the liberal policy here advocated. 47 It would be highly bene-
ficial if the next legislature would see fit to re-enact the statute, with
additional improvements 48 and the necessary enacting clause.
The better view as provided.by statute in North Carolina,4 0 is that
entry of the final decree is final and cannot be set aside for failure fully
to protect the rights of the natural parents where they are made parties.
By the logic of the instant case it would make no difference whether the
final decree had been entered or not, because according to the rule laid
down, a decree without consent is no decree at all, and consent given
under duress is no consent at all. Even conceding the contention that
there was duress the case still has potentialities of thwarting adoptions.
The person on whom the duress has been practiced can wait for years
and assert his rights at leisure, the adoptive parents in the meantime
having expended all the effort that accompanies parenthood in bringing
the child through the most difficult years. Greater consideration than
this should be given to the attachment between the adoptive parents and
the child that has grown out of the new relationship. Since it is highly
desirable that the break between the infant and the mother be abrupt
and final, 50 the natural parents should not be heard to assert any such
objection after the probationary period is over and the final decree
entered. Public policy demands that the adoption statutes should not
' Hanft, Thwarting Adoptions, 19 N. C. L. REv. 127 (1941).
'q For an excellent discussion of modern policy toward adoptions see: In re
Adoption of a Minor, 144 F. 2d 644 (App. D. C. 1944).
"Statutorwy Changes in. N. C. in 1941, 19 N. C. L. Rxv. 435, 449-453 (1941).
" A Survey of Statutory Changes, 25 N. C. L. Rxv. 376, 408-412 (1947).
ln re Advisory Opinion, 227 N. C. Appendix, 43 S. E. 2d 73 (1947).
N. C. Pub. Laws, 1947, c. 885.
The statute included in its express declaration of primary purposes "... and
to protect them (children) from interference, long after they have become properly
adjusted in their adoptive homes, by natural parents who may have some legal
claim because of a defect in the adoption procedure."
It included in its express declaration of secondary purposes "... and to protect
foster parents . . . and prevent later disturbance of their relationship to the child
by natural parents whose legal rights have not been fully protected."
"I A Survey of Statutory Changes, 25 N. C. L. REv. 376, 408-412 (1947).
'9 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §48-5.
'1 In re Adoption of a Minor, 144 F. 2d 644 (App. D. C. 1944).
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be nullified by a decision that causes the.public to, fear the consequences
of adopting a child when their efforts are at the whim and caprice of
the natural parent.51
J. W. ALEXANDER, JR.
Bills and Notes-Reacquisition-Liability of Intermediate
Indorser to Purchaser from Reacquiring Payee
The payee of a negotiable promissory note indorsed the note to the
defendant. The defendant shortly thereafter indorsed it back to the
payee, who indorsed to the plaintiff. Plaintiff was admittedly a holder
in due course. All indorsements were special. Held: Reacquisition by
the payee gave the note a "fresh start," terminating the contractual
liability of the intermediate indorser, so that he could not be regarded
as in the line through which the holder traced his title.'
It is important that the problem of the instant case be distinguished
at the outset from that arising under §582 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law.
We are here concerned with a holder who is a holder in due course
in his own right. The specific question is: Does an indorser remain
liable to a subsequent holder in due course, in spite of reacquisition by
a prior party, when the holder took with notice of the reacquisition?
Section 58,3 on the other hand, deals with defenses available to prior
parties when the instrument is in the hands of a holder not in due
course. This section reads as follows: "In the hands of any holder
other than a holder in due course, a negotiable instrument is subject to
the same defenses as if it were non-negotiable. But a holder who de-
rives his title through a holder in due course and who is not himself a
party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instrument, has all the rights
of such former holder in respect of all parties prior to the latter." Thus
the specific question arising under this section is: Under what circum-
stances can a holder not in due course avoid the defenses of prior
parties ?
This distinction is necessary, for, as will be noted below, the courts
have confused the issue somewhat in discussing the instant problem, by
drawing §58 into the picture, though it is obviously inapplicable. 4
Ex parte Schultz, 181 P. 2d 585 (Nev. 1947).
1 Denniston's Adm'r v. Jackson, 304 Ky. 261, 200 S. W. 2d 477 (1947), briefly
noted in 46 MicH. L. REv. 97.IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §25-64 (quoted in text below).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §25-64.
For an extensive discussion of the problem arising under this section, see Chafee,
The Reacquisition of a. Negotiable Instrument by a Prior Party, 21 CoL L. Rxv.
538 (1921). Also see Note, 1 N. C. L. REv. 187 (1923).
, See 46 MIcE. L. Rnv. 97, 98 (1947) (brief discussion of the difference be-
tween these two problems).
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The exact problem of the principal case has arisen very few times
either under the law merchant 5 or the Negotiable Instruments Law.6
There was a split of authority under the law merchant,7 and that split
has been carried forward8 by virtue of the fact that the Negotiable
Instruments Law has no express provision covering the situation. Thus
in North Carolina Adrian v. McCaskil9 released the intermediate in-
dorser, and its doctrine was applied under the Negotiable Instruments
Law by Ray v. Livingston;'0 while in Massachusetts, West Boston
Savings Bank v. Thompson'1 held the indorser, and was approved
after adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law by State Finance
Corp. v. Pistorino.12 The one other case decided under the Negotiable
Instruments Law cited the Massachusetts cases and allowed the pur-
chaser from the reacquiring payee to hold the intermediate indorser,
only to be reversed on appeal on another ground.18
5 Howe Mach. Co. v. Hadden, 12 Fed. Cas. 710, No. 6, 785 (C. C. Ind. 1878)(releasing the indorser) ; West Boston Savings Bank v. Thompson, 124 Mass. 506
(1878) (holding the indorser) ; Adrian v. McCaskill, 103 N. C. 182, 9 S. E. 284
(1889) (releasing the intermediate indorser) ; see Herrick v. Carman, 12 Johns.
159, 161 (N. Y. 1815) (Note the interpretation of the holding of this case in Hall
v. Newcomb, 7 Hill 416, 420 [N. Y. 1844].).
'Denniston's Adm'r v. Jackson, 304 Ky. 261, 200 S. W. 2d 477 (1947) ; State
Finance Corp. v. Pistorino, 245 Mass. 402, 139 N. E. 653 (1923) (holding the
indorser) ; Ray v. Livingston, 204 N. C. 1, 167 S. E. 496 (1933), 17 MiNN. L.
Rnv. 808 (releasing the indorser) ; Persky v. Bank of America Nat. Ass'n, 235
App. Div. 146, 256 N. Y. S. 572 (1932) (holding the indorser), rev'd on other
grounds, 261 N. Y. 212, 185 N. E. 77 (1933). (The decision in the Persky case,
holdirig the indorser, relied heavily on several cases in which the plaintiff pur-
chased the instrument before maturity from the party primarily liable thereon,
and was allowed to recover from a defendant who had indorsed prior to such
acquisition or reacquisition by the primary party. Rogers v. Gallagher, 49 Ill. 182
[1868] [Payee indorsed a bill to the acceptor and was held liable to a purchaser
who took from the acceptor before maturity.]; Eckert v. Cameron, 43 Pa. 120
[1862] [note reacquired by the maker and negotiated to the plaintiff]; cf. Horn v.
Nicholas, 139 Tenn. 453, 201 S. W. 756 [1918]. See also National Bank v. Lindsey,
25 Del. 83, 78 AtI. 407 [1910] [Note was indorsed to plaintiff by maker after
hidorsing to and reacquiring from the defendant. Recovery was allowed.]; see
Peltierv. McFerson, 67 Colo. 505, 507, 186 Pac. 524, 525 [1920]; Chicago Title
& Trust Co. v. Bidderman, 275 Ill. App. 457, 468-73 [1934]. See Note L. R. A.
1918 E 170 [and the cases cited therein] for an extensive discussion of this prob-
lem. It is submitted by the writer that the analogy between the problem of these
cases and that of the principal case is certainly well drawn. It should be noted
that the Kentucky court, in Denniston's Adn'r v. Jackson, referred to its being
influenced by the Kentucky position, "differing from the majority," that "when a
maker of a note acquires it by assignment or endorsement, the obligation is ex-
tinguished and cannot be revived." Conley v. Louisa Nat. Bfink, 296 Ky. 797, 178
S. W. 17 [1943]; Long v. Bank of Cynthiana, 11 Ky. 290 [1822]. The court
recognized, of course, the fact that these cases did not preclude its holding the
intermediate indorser.).
See note 5 supra.
s See note 6 supra.
p103 N. C. 182, 9 S. E. 284 (1889).10204 N. C. 1, 167 S. E. 496 (1933).
11124 Mass. 506 (1878).
12245 Mass. 402, 139 N. E. 653 (1923).1 Persky v. Bank of America Nat. Ass'n, 235 App. Div. 146, 256 N. Y. S. 572
(1932), rev'd on other grounds, 261 N. Y. 212, 185 N. E. 77 (1933).
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That was the situation at the time the Kentucky court approached the
problem, in the instant case, and in reaching its conclusion the court
relied largely on the two North Carolina cases. Therefore a critical
comment on the decision in Denniston's Adm'r v. Jackson14 necessitates
an analysis of Adrian v. McCaskill, and its life-giver under the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law, Ray v. Livingston.
In the Adrian case the plaintiff purchased the note in question, after
maturity, from the payee. At the time it bore two blank indorsements-
that of the payee followed by that of the defendant. Plaintiff knew
nothing of any prior transaction between the payee and the defendant.
In affirming a judgment rendered for the defendant, the court noted
the law merchant rule15 which prevented a reacquiring party from hold-
ing liable a subsequent indorser to whom he would in turn be liable.
With no reference to the origin of this rule, and without citing any
authority, the court read in the following extension:16 "It must be
equally clear that one who derives possession from him, with notice of
the fact,. cannot hold such intermediate indorsers liable. .. ." The
court stated that the indorsements were sufficient to charge the plaintiff
with notice of the reacquisition.
Forty-four years later, after the adoption of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law, the North Carolina court approved the rule of the Adrian
case and applied it in Ray v. Livingston. The plaintiff was a holder in
due course. The note bore only two genuine signatures-the indorse-
ment of the payee followed by that of the defendant. The signatures
of three co-makers and four additional blank indorsements were forged.
The circumstances under which the defendant had indorsed did not
appear, but the note was purchased by the plaintiff from the payee, and
the court assumed a negotiation by the payee to the defendant and a
renegotiation-the possession of the payee raising a presumption of
ownership. Plaintiff brought suit on the warranties for whih the de-
fendant's indorsement stood by virtue of §6617 of the Negotiable In-
14304 Ky. 261, 200 S. W. 2d 477 (1947).
Bishop v. Hayward, 4 T. R. 470, 100 Eng. Rep. 1124 (1791) (The payee of
a note was not allowed to recover from the defendant, to whom the payee had
originally indorsed. The court admitted that there might have been circumstances
under which he could have recovered, in which no circuity would be involved.
Thus the ground for so holding was circuity of action.) ; Britten v. Webb, 2 B. &
C. 483, 107 Eng. Rep. 463 (1824) (Drawer of bill to 6wn order was not allowed
to recover from the party to whom he had originally indorsed. Plaintiff sought to
make this one of the exceptions mentioned in the Bishop case, by alleging agree-
ment by defendant to indorse as security for payment by drawee, but the court
said there was no consideration for the agreement, so the case involved circuity of
action and the rule of the Bishop case applied.).
'
0 Adrian v. McCaskill, 103 N. C. 182, 186, 9 S. E. 284, 285 (1889).
N. C. GnN: STAT. (1943) §25-72: "Every indorser who indorses without
qualification warrants to all subsequent holders in due course (1) the matters and
things mentioned in subdivisions one, two, and three of §25-71 [genuineness, good
title, and capacity of prior parties to contract] ; and (2) that the instrument is at
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struments Law, and, in pressing his claim, relied on the language of
that. section, that "Every indorser who indorses without qualification,
warrants to all [italics supplied] subsequent holders in due course .... "
The court did not let this language trouble it however. It merely
stated that the section should be considered in connection with the other
provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law, and proceeded to muddle
the picture by injecting the problem arising under §58. The court then
quoted §5018 (in part a codification of the common law rule preventing
suit by a reacquiring party against a subsequent indorser), and con-
cluded by restating the law as announced in Adrian v. McCasldll.
Thus the court set out to reason away the efficacy of §66, and wound
up without having done so19 by reciting the codification of the rule of
the law merchant of which the Adrian case was an extension, and hold-
ing directly on the basis of that case. 20
the time of his indorsement valid and subsisting. And in addition he engages that
on due presentment it shall be accepted or paid, or both, as the case may be, ac-
cording to itz tenor, and that if it be dishonored and the necessary proceedings on
dishonor be duly taken he will pay the amount thereof to the holder or to any
subsequent indorser -who may be compelled to pay it."
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §25-56:"Where an instrument is negotiated back
to a prior party, such party may, subject to the provisions of this chapter, reissue
and further negotiate the same. But he [italics supplied] is not entitled to enforce
payment thereof against any intervening party to whom he was personally liable."
9 "The decision is clearly wrong. The court relied on the last sentence of
section 50, but clearly overlooked tha fact that by section 66 the warranty runs to
all subsequent holders in due course." BRANNAN'S NEGOTrABLE INsTRUMENTS
LAW, 532 (6th ed., Beutel, 1938). "The court evidently overlooked the word 'all'
in this section [§66]." Id. at 814.
Professor Britton began a recital of the holding of this case: "Without ref-
erence to Sections 65 and 66. . . ." BRITTOx, BILLS AND NoTES §299 n. 2 (1943).
20 The court made no reference to the possibility of the plaintiff's having relied
on the defendant's indorsement as having been for the accommodation of the payee.
Evidently the question was not raised by the parties. In Adrian v. McCaskill,
103 N. C.. 182, 188, 9 S. E. 284, 285 (1889), the court intimated that had the
plaintiffs purchased before maturity so as to be "'bona fide holders before ma-
turity,'" they might have been able to recover from the intermediate indorser be-
cause of such reliance. It should be noted that in each of these two N. C. cases
the indorsements were in blank, and the payees, from whom the plaintiffs had
purchased, had not indorsed after the defendant. Some courts have held the in-
termediate indorser on these grounds, saying that the indorsements import accom-
modation. Mauldin v. Branch Bank, 2 Ala. 502 (1841); Palmer v. Whitney, 21
Ind. 58 (1863) (Intermediate indorsement is presumed to be for accommodation
"in absence of contrary proof." The court said the bill was indorsed by the payee
to the defendant, back to the payee, and by him indorsed to the plaintiff, but did
not say whether by special or blank indorsements.); see Howe Mach. Co. v.
Hadden, 12 Fed. Cas. 710, No. 6, 785 (C. C. Ind. 1878) (The court discussed these
cases, but did not follow them, for it was dealing with special indorsements, and,
in addition, the complaint disclosed that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the
fact that the instrument had been negotiated to the defendant by the payee.).
Note the interpretation of State Finance Corp. v. Pistorino, 245 Mass. 402, 139
N. E. 653 (1923), in 17 MINN. L. REV. 808 (as restricting the application of the
rule of the Ray case to regular indorsers, because the court remarked that the
trial court had found the defendants to be accommodation indorsers).
Thomas B. Paton, General Counsel for the American Bankers Ass'n, gave as
his opinion that when a note payable to the order of the maker is purchased by
the holder before maturity from the maker, on which appear an indorsement by
the maker, an indorsement by an individual, and another by the maker, the indi-
vidual is liable as an accommodation indorser. 1 PATON's DIGEST §2722 (1926).
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An analysis of the Denniston. case again shows no consideration of
the history of the common law rule on which §50 is based. The Ken-
tucky court gave no more adequate consideration to the effect of the
Negotiable Instruments Law on the problem at hand than did the North
Carolina court in Ray v. Livigston. In fact, only two sections were
cited, §§ 50 and 58, and it is again submitted that the latter has no ap-
plication to this particular situation.
Those two cases under the Negotiable Instruments Law which held
the intermediate indorser gave no extensive reasons for so doing, but
reached what is believed to be much the sounder conclusion.2 1 That
result is suggested by the history of the common law rule that is em-
bodied in §50. The rule was aimed solely at preventing circuity o.f
action, with no suggestion, express or implied, of a rational basis for
its extension to relieve an intermediate indorser of the liability to sub-
sequent purchasers which he assumes by virtue of his indorsement.22
It did not extinguish this liability; it merely prevented the action by
the reacquiring party.23 The rule was based on the policy of the law
to prevent circuity of action,24 and therefore is necessarily applicable
only where it will do so. Would circuity of action be the result of
allowing a purchaser from a reacquiring payee to hold the intermediate
indorser? Emphatically no-no more so than it results from a holder's
suing the third indorser rather than the first, or the maker. Thus the
situation under discussion is not within the rationale of §50, and the
purchaser from a reacquiring party, a holder in due course, should take
free of "defenses available to prior parties among themselves," under
§57,25 unless the Negotiable Instruments Law affords some other basis
for saying that reacquisition discharges the intermediate indorser, so
that he is not a party "liable thereon." 26
Is there any such basis? As shown above, the courts have found
none, and that is fairly indicative of the answer. The writer submits
that there is none.
"- See Chafee, The Reacquisition. of a Negotiable Instrument by a Prior Party,
21 COL. L. REv. 538, 551-53 (1921) (His discussion deals with reacquisition and
reissue by a primarily liable party, favoring holding the intermediate indorser, but
he mentions that the same principle applies to reacquisition by any prior party.) ;
see BRaITON, BILLS AND NOTES §300 (1943) (He argues that even a purchaser
after maturity should be allowed to recover from an intermediate indorser.).
2 "The provisions just quoted from Sections 50 and 121 were put in, therefore,
to prevent circuity of action. The phrasing of these statutory rules unites with
the reason for the rules strongly to suggest that they were not directed against
any person other than the reacquirer." BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES, §300 (1943).
" Cases cited note 15 supra.
" Cases cited note 15 supra.
" N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §25-63: "A holder in due course holds the instru-
ment free from any defect of title of prior parties, and free from defenses available
to prior parties among themselves, and may enforce payment of the instrument for
the full amount thereof against all parties liable thereon."
2" See note 25 supra.
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Section 12127 may be disregarded, for its use of the word "paid"
strongly suggests, when considered in the light of §8828 (defining pay-
ment in due course), that it applied only to parties reacquiring after
maturity, by virtue of payment in due course, rather than to a reacqui-
-sition in the usual course of business before maturity.2 9 There remains
§120,80 which explicitly enumerates the means by which a party second-
arily liable may be discharged, and there is no mention of discharge
through reacquisition by a prior party. Its manner of expression would
-seem to indicate that it was meant to exhaust the field.81
Nor is there any reason, speaking purely on the merits of the prob-
lem, why such an indorser should be discharged82 "because of the for-
tuitous event that the instrument got back into the hands of a subse-
quent holder."3 3
Thus is should follow that an intermediate indorser is liable to a
holder in due course who purchased from a reacquiring payee, even
27N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §25-128: "When the instrument is paid by a party
secondarily liable thereon it is not discharged; but the party so paying it is re-
mitted to his former rights as regards all prior parties, and he may strike out his
own and all subsequent indorsements, and again negotiate the instrument, except
(1) where it is payable to the order of the third person and has been paid by the
drawer; and (2) where it was made or accepted for accommodation and has been
paid by the party accommodated."
28 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §25-95: "Payment is made in due course when it is
made at or after the maturity of the instrument to the holder thereof in good
faith and without notice that his title is defective."
2" See BRiToN, BILLS AND NoTEs §294 (1943). But see Chafee, rupra note 21,
at 548. The origin of the first exception of §121 also supports the above construc-
tion of that section, for it is generally recognized as having been created by Lord
Mansfield in Beck v. Robley, 1 H. Bl. 89, 126 Eng. Rep. 54 (1788) (See Chafee,
supra note 21, at 552.), in which a bill was not paid when due, and was taken up
by the drawer. Thus, as it originated, the "paid" of the exception was payment
after maturity.
'IN. C. Gix. STAT. (1943) §25-127: "A party secondarily liable on the instru-
ment is discharged (1) by any act which discharges the instrument; (2) by the
intentional cancellation of his signature by the holder; (3) by the discharge of a
prior party; (4) by a valid tender of payment made by a prior party; (5) by a
release of the principal 'debtor, unless the holder's right of recourse against the
party secondarily liable is expressly reserved; (6) by any agreement binding upon
the holder to extend the time of payment or to postpone the holder's right to en-
force the instrument, unless made with the assent of the party secondarily liable
or unless the right of recourse against such party is expressly reserved."See BrrJToN. BIu.s AND NOTES §300 (1943).
22 It should be noted that in several of the cases the defendant originally took
the instrument for security purposes only. Denniston's Adm'r v. Jackson, 304 Ky.
261, 200 S. W. 2d 477 (1947) ; West Boston Savings Bank v. Thompson, 124 Mass.
506 (1878); Adrian v. McCaskill, 103 N. C. 182, 9 S. E. 284 (1889). Thus it
might be argued that his position differs somewhat from that of an intermediate
indorser who really purchases an instrument and sells it back to a prior party, if
the subsequent purchaser from the reacquiring party has actual knowledge of the
transaction. This goes purely to the merits however, for there is nothing in the
present law to warrant any such distinction. In the opinion of the writer, the
argument is tenuous at best, for the party who takes for security need not indorse
the instrument in order to return it to his indorser, and if he does he should be
held liable.
"BSTTON, BnILs AND NoTEs §300 (1943).
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though the holder had actual knowledge of the reacquisition. This view
is supported by that language of §66 which was so completely disre-
garded in Ray v. Livingston.
The Negotiable Instruments Law is now being revised by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Law Institute, as a part of their Commercial Code project.8 4
This problem should be dealt with explicitly so that there will be no
question but what an intermediate indorser will be held to that liability
which he assumes.35
ALFRED D. WARD
Criminal Law-North Carolina Bastardy Statute-Support
of Illegitimate Children
In State v. Stiles,' the defendant was indicted for willful failure to
support his illegitimate child. In order to secure a conviction under
this indictment, it is necessary that the State prove two elements. First,
that the defendant is the father of the illegitimate child, and second,
that his failure to support the child was willful.2
The prosecutrix's testimony as to the conception presented sufficient
evidence on the point of paternity to support the jury's finding that
the defendant was the father of the child. Since the defendant admitted
having failed to support the child, it was only incumbent upon the prose-
cution to show that his failure to support was accompanied by a willful
intent. When the State proved that the defendant had known of the
prosecutrix's pregnant condition and her requests for "aid" even before
the birth of the child, the jury was fully justified in finding that his
subsequent failure to support the child was willful, without justification
or excuse. However, had the State failed to establish the requisite;
willful intent, the defendant would have been guilty of no crime, since
the statute makes willfullness a necessary ingredient of the offense. 8
The present statute4 under which the defendant was indicted super-
seded the old Bastardy Proceedings. Bastardy Proceedings5 were civil
" See HANDBOOK AND PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 143 (1944).
" It has been learned through correspondence that the revision in its present
tentative form includes a provision discharging an intermediate indorser on re-
acquisition by a prior party. This draft is, of course, "subject to change without
notice," and the writer hopes that such will be the fate of the provision in question.
2228 N. C. 137, 44 S. E. 2d 728 (1947).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §49-2.
' State v. Vanderlip, 225 N. C. 610, 35 S. E. 2d 885 (1945) ; State v. Hayden,
224 N. C. 779, 32 S. E. 2d 333 (1944) ; State v. Allen, 224 N. C. 530, 31 S. E. 2d
530 (1944) ; State v. Moore, 220 N. C. 535, 11 S. E. 2d 660 (1941) ; State v.
McLamb, 214 N. C. 322, 199 S. E. 81 (1938); State v. Tarlton, 208 N. C. 734,
182 S. E. 481 (1935) ; State v. Tyson, 208 N. C. 231, 180 S. E. 85 (1935).
N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §49-2.
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §265.
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in nature and to secure a court decree for the maintenance and support
of -the child, it was only necessary that the State show by the preponder-
ance of the evidence that the defendant was the father of the child.
Under the present laws, however, the establishment of paternity only
satisfies the proof of one of the two requisite elements, and since it is a
criminal statute, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt rather
than by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant willfully
failed to support the child. The defendant enters the trial with a pre-
sumption of innocence, and this includes innocence from any willful
failure on his part to support his child.6 The failure to support may be
an evidential fact tending to prove his willful intent. However, the
judge will commit reversible error to charge the jury that the mere
finding of a failure to support gives rise to a presumption of willfulness.
7
In the principal case, the judge instructed the jury that the defendant
was indicted for.Bastardy and that North Carolina had a statute which
made it a crime for a man to have intercourse with a woman and be-
come the father of an illegitimate child. He later stated that the State
was not relying on this statute. He further instructed the jury that
the crime included a failure to support and pay medical expenses in-
curred when the child was born. Considering the first part of these
instructions, the jury was at liberty to render a verdict of guilty based
solely upon the fact that they found the defendant to be the father of the
child, and yet no statute exists in this State making such conduct a
criminal offense.8 The Judge's attempted curative statement that the
State was not relying on this statute, at most only served to confuse
the jury, and not to lessen the prejudice already heaped upon the de-
fendant. The .instructions concerning medical expenses were incorrect
as a matter of law, for willful failure to provide such expenses is not a
criminal offense although the court may require provision therefor upon
the defendant's conviction.9
The trial judge's error illustrates one of the many difficulties which
may arise in the application of this statute. The Supreme Court of
North Carolina more than once has criticized this act for its ambiguity
and impossibility of satisfactory construction.' 0
The legislature has provided that the court may order the defendant
to pay the mother the necessary medical expenses incurred in bearing
the child. However, this order can, be issued only after the defendant
* State v. Spellman, 210 N. C. -271, 186 S. E. 322 (1936) ; State v. Cook, 207
N. C. 261, 176 S. E. 757 (1934).
*State v. Cook, 207 N_ C. 261, 176 S. E. 757 (1934).
B State v. Tyson, 208 N. C. 231, 108 S. E. 85 (1935).
* State v. Summerlin, 224 N. C. 178, 29 S. E. 2d 462 (1944).
1* State v. White, 225 N. C. 351, 34 S. E. 2d 139 (1945) ; State v. Summerlin,
224 N. C. 178, 29 S. E. 2d 462 (1944); State v. Dill, 224 N. C. 57, 29 S. E. 2d
145 (1944).
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has been found guilty of a willful failure to support the child. Medical
expenses are no part of a child's support." The reputed father is under
no duty to support a dead child. Therefore, the mother apparently has
no grounds upon which to bring an action under the statute to collect
such medical expenses when the child dies at birth. 12  It is doubtful
that the legislature intended this result in view of the fact that the
former statute-1 afforded her compensation for such expenses, and
further considering that the legislature in the present act expressly
recognizes the father's duty to pay for such expenses.
The difficulty of interpreting the legislative intent concerning medi-
cal expenses again arises when such expenses are considered in light of
the statute of limitations.' 4 Payments for the support of the child by
the reputed father within three years of birth will extend the statute
of limitationsY5 This is allowed upon the theory that the payment by
the reputed father is an acknowledgment of his issue. But since medical
expenses incurred in birth are not a part of the child's support, payment
of these alone will apparently not extend the statute in favor of the
mother.' 6 If the basis of this extension is the acknowledgment by the
reputed father of his issue, could it be reasonably contended that pay-
ment of medical expenses incurred in birth is any less an acknowledg-
ment than payments made to support the child?
The statute of limitations in part reads, "Proceedings under this
article to establish paternity of such child may be instituted at any time
within three years next after the birth of the child, and not thereafter."''
To understand why the legislature restricted the application of the stat-
ute of limitations to proceedings to establish paternity, it is necessary to
consider the general purpose of the chapter and the operation of the
diverse sections within it. The act expressly recognizes that the statu-
tory crime consists of two elements, one, the establishment of paternity,
and two, proof of willful failure to -support. Affirmative proof of the
first is a condition precedent to allowing a verdict of guilty upon the
second. Hence, if proof of paternity is barred there can be no action
for failure to support. But, if paternity is established within the allowed
three years, the legislature must have intended that the State be able to
prosecute the action at anytime within the first fourteen years of the
child's life. This should be true since failure to support is a continuing
crime. I s The provisions for bringing preliminary proceedings would
11State v. Summerlin, 224 N. C. 178, 29 S. E. 2d 462 (1944).
's This issue has not yet been decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court.
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §273.
21 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) § 49-4.
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §49-4.
10 This issue has not yet been decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court.
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §49-4.
"s See Mr. Justice Barnhill, dissenting in State v. Dill, 224 N. C. 57, 29 S. E.
2d 145 (1944).
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be meaningless if the three year statute of limitations is construed to
bar all action under this act. For, if this were so, even after the estab-
lishment of paternity in a preliminary proceeding, it would still be
incumbent upon the State to bring an action for failure to support within
three years from birth. Since paternity may be establishd in the prose-
.cution for failure to support, there would be no purpose in having pre-
liminary proceedings if all action under the act is barred three years
after birth. It would seem that if the legislature had intended this
result they would have said prosecutions under this article are barred
rather than designating specifically preliminary proceedings.
A proviso is written into the statute of limitations which is as fol-
lows: "provided however that when the reputed father has acknowledged
paternity of the child by payments for the support of such child within
three years from the date of birth thereof, and not later, then, in such
case, prosecution may be brought under the provisions of such sections
within three years from the date of such acknowledgment of paternity
of such child by the reputed.father thereof."'19 The proviso by its own
language limits its operation to the particular case of acknowledgment
by payments, and does not act as a restriction upon the three year statute
of limitations. It is intended to give additional rights, and not to limit
those already given. Construed thus, the proviso gives the mother the
additional right to have the defendant prosecuted for failure to support,
even though the statute of limitations prevents her from establishing
paternity in a preliminary hearing. Since the father has affirmatively
recognized his child, it is reasonable to conclude that the legislature
intended that the mother should be given a further opportunity to force
the father to perform his duty to the child.
In final analysis, the mother, if she establishes paternity in a pre-
liminary proceedings, is given fourteen years from the birth of the child
to have the State institute action for failure to support; however, if she
fails to establish such paternity in preliminary proceedings within the
allowed time, the State must institute action for failure to support within
the extended period of three years from the last payment in support
made within three years from birth or the action is forever barred.20
The North Carolina Supreme Court to date has not accepted this
interpretation of the statute of limitations. In State v. Bradshaw,21
the court held that the statute of limitations2 2 (which read at that time,
"Proceedings under this act may be instituted at any time within three
years after birth of the child and not thereafter") barred any action
I N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §49-4.
2' State v. Dill. 224 N. C. 57, 29 S. E. 2d 145 (1944). This would seem to be
in accord with the separate dissenting views presented by Justices Seawell and
Barnhill.
2- 214 N. C. 5, 197 S. E. 564 (1938).
-" N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §276(c).
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under the statute after the expiration of three years from the birth of the
child. In 1939 the statute of limitations was amended to its present
form.23 The effect of the 1939 amendment on the former statute of
limitations was first considered in State v. Killian, where the court said:
"This section (the former statute of limitations) however was definitely
changed by Section 3 of Chapter 217 Public Laws 1939 (the present
statute of limitations) which limited the application thereof to proceed-
ings to establish the paternity of such child." 24 Considering this state-
ment, it is difficult to understand why the court has held that "the only
material change wrought by the particular amendatory proviso was to
extend the time within which prosecutions may be brought when the
reputed father has acknowledged his child by payments...." 25 There-
fore, today the law in North Carolina requires that prosecutions be com-
menced within three years of birth or they are barred by the statute of
limitations, unless the proviso is made operative because of payments in
acknowledgment, in which case the maximum limit for commencing
the action would be six years from birth.
A father's initial gift to an illegitimate child is universal condemna-
tion. This irreparable disservice should not be further perpetuated by
allowing the father to escape the financial responsibility of his wrongful
act because of ambiguity in our law. Nor could the legislature have
intended such a result. The legislature has expressly distinguished
proceedings and prosecutions, but, if there be any uncertainty, society
and common decency dictate that it should be construed in favor of the
unfortunate child.
THOMAS A. WADDEN, JR.
Federal Jurisdiction-joinder of Non-Federal Claim
with Federal Question
Plaintiff brought an action against FBI agents to recover damages
allegedly resulting from an unlawful search and seizure of the plaintiff's
property and from a deprivation of his liberty and property without
due process of law in violation of his immunities guaranteed by the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The
district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the
complaint failed to state a federal claim for which relief could be
granted, and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.- The Supreme
Court reversed 2 on the grounds that the plaintiff had clearly and in
N' . C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §49-4.
"State v. Killian, 217 N. C. 339, 341, 7 S. E. 2d 702, 703 (1940).
2'224 N. C. 57, 29 S. E. 2d 462 (1944) ; see State v. Killian, 217 N. C. 339,.
341, 7 S. E. 2d 702, 703 (1940).
Bell v. Hood, 150 F. 2d 96 (C. C. A. 9th 1945).
'Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678 (1946). Mr. Chief Justice Stone and Mr. Justice
Burton dissented on the ground that "The district court is without jurisdiction as
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good faith founded his claim on provisions of the Constitution, and
that the claim was substantial and not frivolous so that the district court
should have taken jurisdiction before determining whether or not relief
could be granted. The district court then took jurisdiction and held:
1., that no provision of the Constitution or laws of the United States
gave a right of action in any person against a federal officer who violates
that person's immunities under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and
2., that the federal court was without jurisdiction to consider any non-
federal cause of action for trespass and false imprisonment arising out
of the facts alleged, since a federal cause of action was entirely wanting.3
The present note is concerned only with the second part of the district
court's holding.
The problem might be stated: to what extent and under what cir-
cumstances may issues, which are non-federal in character, be joined
in a suit before a federal court in cases where jurisdiction depends not
on the nature and relation of the parties4 but on the subject of the action,
Prior to 1933 a variety of approaches to the subject had been taken by
the courts resulting in the inevitable conflict in the cases., Beginning
with Marshall's statement in Osborn v. Bank of the United States( the
general rule was developed that all issues actually raised in a case were
within the judicial power of the district court once jurisdiction had
been acquired over the case by virtue of the substantial federal question
involved, even if the federal question was decided adversely to the
party presenting it, or even if it was not decided at all.7 This rule,
however, had found expression most frequently in proceedings to enjoin
state action on the ground that it would be a violation both of the
Federal Constitution and of the State Constitution or laws,8 and in the
a federal court unless the complaint states a cause of action arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States," at p.' 685, and since neither the federal
law nor the Constitution affords a remedy in this case, no cause of action is stated.
The Justices further observed that the only effect of the majority holding is to
require the district court to pass upon the local question of trespass, citing Hum
v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238 (1933).
'Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813 (S. D. Cal. 1947).
'The new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U. S. C. A. following §723(c),
Rule 18(a) provides that a party ". . . may join either as independent or as alter-
nate claims as many claims either legal or equitable or both as he may have against
an opposing party," if joinder of parties and other rules are satisfied, so that where
there is diversity of citizenship almost unlimited joinder of claims is permitted.
See 2 MooRE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 2118-2123 (1938).
'Note, 40 HARv. L. RFv. 298 (1926).
99 Wheat. 738, 823 (U. S. 1824) ". . . when a question to which the judicial
power of the Union is extended by the Constitution forms an ingredient of the
original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdic-
tion of that cause, although other questions of fact or of law may be involved
in it."
Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 393 (1923); Lincoln Gas & Electric
Light Co. v. City of Lincoln, 250 U. S. 256, 264 (1919); Siler v. Louisville &
Nashville R. R., 213 U. S. 175, 191 (1909).
8 Chicago G. W. Ry. v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94 (1924); Davis v. Wallace, 257
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main had been disregarded in the great mass of cases where a claim for
unfair competition was sought to be joined in a suit for patent, trade-
mark or copyright infringement. 9 In 1933 the United States Supreme
Court, in the case of Hum v. Oursler,10 endeavored to resolve the con-
flict, holding that a common law claim for unfair competition should,
have been passed on by the district court on its merits when joined with
a claim for copyright infringement over which the court had assumed
jurisdiction, even though it found there had been no infringement. But
in "attempting to formulate some rule on the subject""' the court is
said to have prescribed two conditions, viz., that the claims must rest
on "substantially identical" facts,' 2 and that the non-federal claim must
not be actually a separate and distinct cause of actiorr simply joined in
the complaint with a federal cause.' 3 Courts not in sympathy with this
decision have availed themselves of these limitations (that they find
in it) to dismiss non-federal claims which would appear to fall well
within the intent or purpose, and some even within the explicit wording,
of the rule allowing jurisdiction. Thus, the simplest device for avoid-
ing the Hum case has been to find that some additional, even if closely
related, fact must be presented to make out the non-federal claim.14
U. S. 478 (1922) ; Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. R., 244 U. S. 499 (1917) ;
Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917); Ohio Tax Cases,
232 U. S. 576 (1914) ; and cases cited note 7 supra.
'The'cases seem to have relied principally on language in Stark Bros. Co. v.
Stark, 255 U. S. 50 (1921); Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick, 201 U. S.
166 (1906) and Elgin Nat'l Watch Case Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U. S.
665 (1901). See Geneva Furniture Co. v. Karpen & Bros., 238 U. S. 254 (1915) ;
Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Co., 220 U. S. 446 (1911). For cita-
tions to lower court holdings see Schulman and Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional
Limitations on, Federal Procedure, 45 YALE L. 1. 393, 406 (1936) and Note, 52
YALE L. J. 922, 923 (1943) ; indicating the various approaches, Note, 1 U. or CHI.
L. Rav. 480, 482 (1934).
10289 U. S. 238 (1933). Three claims were joined in the complaint, (1) for
infringement of the copyrighted play, (2) for unfair competition with regard to
the copyrighted play, and (3) for unfair competition with regard to an uncopy-
righted version of the same play. The third was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.22Id. at 241.
12 Id. at 246 "Indeed, the claims of infringement and unfair competition so pre-
cisely rest on identical facts as to be little more than the equivalent of different
epithets to characterize the same group of circumstances." Read in its context,
this statement appears rather to emphasize the fact that in the case only one right
was alleged because the two claims rested upon identical facts.
" Id. at 245-6 "But the rule [of the cases cited supra note 7 allowing jurisdic-
tion] does not go so far as to permit a federal court to assume jurisdiction of a
separate and distinct nonfederal cause of action because it is joined in the same
complaint with a federal cause of action." Accordingly, the court dismissed a third
claim for lack of jurisdiction. See note 10 supra.
" Derman v. Stor-Aid, Inc., 141 F. 2d 580 (C. C. A. 2d 1944) ; Zalkind v.
Scheinman, 139 F. 2d 895 (C. C. A. 2d 1943) cert. denied, 322 U. S. 738 (1944) ;
Musher Foundation, Inc. v. Alba Trading Co., Inc., 127 F. 2d 9 (C. C. A. 2d
1942) cert. denied 317 U. S. 641 (1942) ; Foster D. Snell, Inc. v. Potters, 88 F.
2d 611 (C. C. A. 2d 1937). In the last cited case the court not only relies on the
contention that the facts are different, but the non-federal claim "relates to a
different period of time.. . Stark Bros. Co. v. Stark, 225 U. S. 50, 41 S. Ct 221,
65 L. ed. 496, is a flat authority that an action for damages resulting from unfair
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But not less common is the more technical and complex method, that
of finding that the facts alleged in reality present two causes of action.15
In Bell v. Hood,16 the court seems not to have pursued either of
these courses in a clear-cut manner. It does state that the Hum case
is not applicable when the facts relied on to establish the federal claim
are not substantially identical with those setting forth the non-federal
claim17 citing four second circuit cases18 and one district court deci-
sion,19 but does not discuss whether or not that defect appears in the
case before it. Indeed, it is difficult to see how it could.2 0 Rather the
competition prior to registration of the plaintiff's trade-rhark is not within the
federal jurisdiction. We do not read the opinion in Humr v. Oursler as over-
ruling that decision and we think it controls the case at bar." The same court
had previously supposed that the Hurn case had over-ruled the Stark case, "at
least in [its]ratio decindendi.' L. E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F. 2d 27Z
274 (C. C. A. 2d 1934). See Judge Clark's statement in Treasure Imports, Inc.
v. Henry Amder & Sons, Inc., 127 F. 2d 3, 5 (C. C. A. 2d 1942), and Zalkind v.
Scheinman, supra, at 901 n. 14. Whether or not the Stark case was overruled,
some courts continue to exclude from consideration of unfair competition claim,
any act done prior to the alleged patent, copyright or trade-mark. Treasure
Imports, Inc. v. Henry Amdur & Sons, Inc. supra opinion of Hand and Swan, JJ.
at page 6; Hydraulic Press Mfg. Co. v. Columbus Malleable Iron Co., 35 F. Supp.
603 (S. D. Ohio 1940) ; Slaymaker Lock Co. v. Reese, 24 F. Supp. 69 (E. D. Pa.
1938); Mitchell & Webber, Inc. v. Williams-Bridge Mills, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 954
(S. D. N. Y. 1936). For a criticism of this rule see Note, 52 YALE L. J. 922
(1943).
'
2 Crabb v. Welden Bros., 164 F. 2d 797 (C. C. A. 8th 1947) ; Newport Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Crosby Naval Stores, Inc., 139 F. 2d 611 (C C. A. 5th 1944);
American Broadcasting Co. v. Wahl Co., 121 F. 2d 412 (C. C. A. 2d 1941) ; Lewis
v. Vendome Bags, Inc., 108 F. 2d 16 (C. C. A. 2d 1939) ; Foster D. Snell, Inc. v.
Potters, 88 F. 2d 611 (C. C. A. 2d 1937); Fred Benioff Co. v. Benioff, 55 F. Supp.
393 (N. D. Cal. 1944). Danials v. Barfield, 71 F. Supp. 884 (E. D. Pa. 1947)
action brought (1) to gain reemployment under provision of Selective Service
Act and (2) to recover back pay on claim that employment had been at less than
union wage scale. The objection that the causes are separate seems better applied
here, and also in California Water Service Co. v. City of Redding, 304 U. S. 252
(1938) and General Motors Corp. v. Rubsam Corp., 65 F. 2d 217 (C. C. A. 6th
1933) cert. denied 290 U. S. 688 (1933).
" 71 F. Supp. 813, 820 (S. D. Cal. 1947).
17 Id. at 820.
"Dermon v. Stor-Aid, Inc., 141 F. 2d 580 (C. C. A. 2d 1944); Zalkind v.
Scheinman, 139 F. 2d 895 (C. C. A. 2d 1943) ; Musher Foundation, Inc. v. Alba
Trading Co.. 127 F. 2d 9 (C. C. A. 2d 1942); American Broadcasting Co. v.
Wahl Co., 121 F. 2d 412 (C. C. A. 2d 1941). Professor Moore observes that the
"second circuit rule," to which express reference was made in Hum v. Oursler,
fn. at p. 241, was in that case "repudiated by the Supreme Court. Naturally, the
second circuit cannot verbally cling to its former rule; but as a practical matter
it does in many cases just about what it did before, although it now achieves the
result by refusing jurisdiction over the claim of unfair competition by calling it a
separate and distinct cause of action." I MOORe's FEDERAL PRACrIcE (1947 Cum.
Supp.) §2.04, p. 94.9 Fred Benioff Co. v. Benioff, 55 F. Supp. 393, 397 (D. C. Cal. 1944). In
what respect the facts differed does not clearly appear, rather, the court seems to
have looked to the merits.
20 CALiF. CoNsT. Art. I, §19 is identical to the Fourth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution. If anything, more facts would be required to make out a
violation of the latter, among them, evidence that the defendants were federal offi-
cers acting by color of their office. The complaint, set out in the margin of Bell
v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 679 (1946), would seem to allege facts more than suffi-
cient to state a cause of action for trespass and false imprisonment.
[Vol. 26
NOTES AND COMMENTS
judge states that if the two causes of action2 l rest on substantially
identical facts jurisdiction should be taken of the entire case, but that
"in any event, the federal court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the non-
federal cause of -action unless the complaint also alleges a federal cause
of action."'22
First, it is at least doubtful whether the complaint here alleges two
causes of action, or only one, based on two theories of recovery or
predicated on two provisions guaranteeing a single right.23 This, of
course, depends upon the meaning given to a "cause of action." True
the Court in Hum v. Oursler, while recognizing that "cause of action"
may mean one thing for one purpose and something else for another,
indicated24 that for the purpose of determining the bounds between
state and federal jurisdiction courts should stay within the meaning
given in Baltimore S. S. Co. v. Phillips, "the number and variety of
the facts alleged do not establish more than one cause of action so
long as their result. . . . is the violation of but one right by a single
legal wrong."2 5 Even so, can it be said that a person has one right to
the protection of a copyrighted play and two rights to the protection of
his person and papers so that ,an encroachment upon the former gives
him but one cause of action while a violation of the latter gives two? *
However this may be, the requirement that a federal cause of action
must be alleged before the federal court may take jurisdiction over a
non-federal issue arising from the same set of facts seems to be without
authority in the cases.26 The only time failure of the federal claim is
21"Cause of action,' or "ground"? In the rule laid out in the Hurn case, at
246, which runs to the crux of- this problem, great care was taken to distinguish
between cases where two grounds support a single cause of action and those where
two separate causes of action are alleged. (Words italicized by the court). It
would seem for the sake of clarity, in reiterating the rule, the same care should
be taken in the use of these terms.
Bll v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813, 820 (S. D. Cal. 1947).
23 See Clark concurring in Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.
2d 83 (C. C. A. 2d 1939); R.C.A. Manufacturing Co. v. Columbia Recording
Corp., 36 F. Supp. 247 (S. D. N. Y. 1940) ; Clark, The Code Cause of Action,
33 YALE L. J. 817 (1924).
24289 U. S. 238, 246 (1933).
= 274 U. S. 316, 321- (1927). 1 MooR 's FEDERAL PRAcricE §2.04 n. 46 (1938)
it is true that the Hum case uses language reminiscent of Pomeroy's defi-
nition of a cause of action as one primary right plus a delict or breach thereof,
but its decision must be based on a more pragmatic notion, for the jurisdiction
which was sustained embraced two rights-a statutory and a common law right,
and alleged violations of both."2
'L. E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F. 2d 272, 274 (C. C. A. 2d 1934) ...
it is only necessary that we should hold that the cause of suit upon the [federal
ground] was substantial enough to support the jurisdiction of the district court."
Southern Pacific Co. v. Van Hoosear, 72 F. 2d 903, 912 (C. C. A. 9th 1934) "And
as the federal question here presented was a substantial one (and unlike cases of
diversity of citizenship, this suffices) [sic] there was no jurisdictional obstacle on
this score to a judgment for the intrastate rate." Hum v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238,
246 (1933) ". . . where the federal question averred it not plainly wanting in sub-
stance, the federal court.. ." may disp e of the case on the non-federal ground.
Field Packing Co. v. Glenn, 5 F. Supp. 4 5 (W. D. Ky. 1933), modified as to an-
other matter and aff'd 290 U. S. 177 (193. -.
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fatal to jurisdiction of the non-federal matter is where the former is
plainly "unsubstantial," made fraudulently for the purpose of gaining
access to federal courts, or made colorable.21 But, in this case the
Supreme Court had already declared that the contention that the con-
stitutional provisions give no cause of action when violated "does not
show that [plaintiff's] cause is unsubstantial or frivolous, and the com-
plaint does in fact raise serious questions both of law and fact . . ."
and "That question [whether violations of the Amendments give rise
to a cause] has never been specifically decided by this court."2 8
It would seem then that the request to have the issues of trespass and
false imprisonment determined should not have been denied for the
reasons given by the district judge. Had he found that the two issues
were not based on substantially identical facts, or that they were two
separate and distinct causes of action, without much question the result
would be within the rule of the Hurn decision, though in this writer's
opinion, either would have been a finding not warranted by the facts
of the case.2 9
The decision may be explained by the fact that the situation is an
unusual one, and to this we get a clue in the judge's statement that "the
[Hurn] decision seems to have been prompted by those considerations
which find expression in the familiar maxim-'Equity delights to do
justice and not by halves' . . . [and] a review of the decisions discloses
that in practice, almost without exception, the rule of Hum v. Oursler
has been applied only to equity cases." 30  While it is true that suits to
enjoin infringement of protected articles have been the primary cause
for invoking the doctrine, neither the Supreme Court nor the lower
courts have intimated that the rule is in any way confined to such cases,
and no reason has been advanced indicating that it should be.3 '
However, the judge in the instant case is not without support from
others of the bench3 2 in his apparent desire to limit the practice of
liberal joinder in this respect, and the topic of whether the doctrine of
the Hurn case is wise from the standpoints of constitutional theory, of
political expediency, and of trial convenience, is a lively one among
27 See Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 682 (1946) ; Siler v. Louisville & Nashville
R. R., 213 U. S. 175, 191 (1909). Rudolf Lesch Fine Arts, Inc. v. Metal, 51 F.
Supp. 69 (S. D. N. Y. 1943). It may be unsubstantial because a recent decision
has made it wholly without merit. California Water Service Co. v. City of Red-
ding, 304 U. S. 252 (1938).
2 Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 685 (1946).
-9 See notes 20 and 23 supra.
Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813, 820 (S. D. Cal. 1947).
An example of a sound application of the rule in a law action can be found
in Southern Pacific Co. v. Van Hoosear, 72 F. 2d 903 (C. C. A. 9th 1934).
" See courts cited notes 14 and 15 supra. But see 60 HARv. L. REV. 424, 430
(1947) indicating Congressional proposal, H. R. 7124 §1338(b), to adopt Hum
rule in Federal Judicial Code with regard to actions on patents, copyrights and
trade-marks.
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writers and judges particularly interested in federal jurisdiction and
procedure.3 3 The argument is made on the one hand that jurisdiction,
where it might conflict with state or local interests should be carefully
confined to limitations clearly established by the Constitution and the
Congress, since our federal system at best is one of peculiar political
sensitivity.3 4 On the other hand it would seem a waste of time and
expense both for the judiciary and the litigants serving no real purpose
-to require that substantially the same facts presented in an action before
a federal court should be retried in a state court when one action should
suffice.35  It has been suggested that Hurn v.- Oursler was carefully
,calculated to strike a compromise between these two opposing considera-
tions,3 6 and indeed, in the very limitations noted above, this seems ap-
parent. The joinder rule of the Siler case is adopted as one of general
application, but only where judicial economy will thereby be served
("substantially identical" facts) and only if the local matter is in reality
a part of the transaction giving rise to the federal claim. The necessity
for showing the federal claim to be substantial has always been a requi-
site to federal jurisdiction, absent diversity. As has been pointed out
elsewhere, 7 the district court is protected by these limitations from
frivolous suits, purely local litigation, and the states from intrusion by
the federal judiciary. "We may concede that problems of allotment of
jurisdiction between state and national courts are fundamentally prob-
lems of government, calling for wise and shrewd statesmanship by any
arbiter of the relations of states to nations in a federal system .-.. .
"E.g., dissenting opinions of Judge Clark in Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F. 2d
895, 905 (C. C. A. 2d 1943), Musher Foundation, Inc. v. Alba Trading Co., 127
F. 2d 9, 11 (C. C. A. 2d 1942), and in Lewis v. Vendome Bags, Inc. 108 F. Od
16, 18 (C. C. A. 2d 1939). 1 MooRas FEDnMAL PRACrlCE (1947 Cum. Supp.) 91
et seq.; 2 id. 25 et seq. Note, 52 YALE L. J. 922 (1943).
" See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 293 U. S. 335, 339 (1934). For cases
illustrating the reluctance of the courts to decide local issues before determination
'by the state courts, see I MooiE's FEDERAL PRACriCE (1947 Cun. Supp.) 180-184.
See generally, Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States
and State Courts, 13 CoRN. L. Q. 499 (1928).
"To this end the Hum rule has been applied by the second circuit in at least
six instances (cited in Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F. 2d 895, 901 n. 7 (C. C. A. 2d
1943)) and in several other circuits, General Shoe Corp. v. Rosen, 111 F. 2d 95
(C. C. A. 4th 1940) ; E. Edelman & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88 F. 2d 852
(C. C. A. 7th 1937) ; Illinois Watch Case Co. v. Hingeco Mfg. Co., 81 F. 2d 41
(C. C. A. 1st 1936); Hemmeter Cigar Co. v. Congress Cigar Co. 118 F. 2d 64
(C. C. A. 6th 1941). It might be said that no time is saved in considering evidence
on a non-federal cause where as in the case under comment the federal cause is
dismissed at the outset. But, non-federal claims have been retained after patent
or copyright held invalid; United Lens Corp. v. Duray Lamp Co. 93 F. 2d 969
(C. C. A. 7th 1937) ; Bulova Watch Co. v. Stolzberg, 69 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass.
1947) ; and even where the federal claim was not considered, Glenn v. Field Pack-
ing Co., 290 U. S. 177 (1933) ; Best & Co. v. Miller, 67 F. Supp. 809 (S. D. N. Y.
1946).
" Shulman and Jaergerman, Some Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal Pro-
cedure, 45 YALE L. J. 393. 400 (1936).T Note, 52 YALE L. J. 922 (1943).
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Even so, there will be no loss to statecraft if in the daily activities of
courts the needs of practical judicial administration may have some
sway to persuade against compelling two lawsuits where one will more
completely serve the interests of the litigants."88
ERNEST W. MACHEN, JR.
Mortgages-Foreclosures-Partial Sale of Land
A executed a deed of trust on four tracts of land to T to secure the
payment of a series of notes payable to C and maturing in 1925. In
1926, T advertised under the power of sale of the deed and sold one of
the tracts of land included therein. In 1928, T advertised and sold two
additional tracts of land. The latter tracts were bought in by C, who
went into possession, but no deed was given him for the land until 1943,
some 18 years after the maturity of the debt. Under the law then
existing, unless a mortgagee was in possession, the foreclosure sale and
the execution and delivery of the deed pursuant thereto, in order to be
valid, must have been completed within 10 years from the date the debt
matured. In a suit by the heirs of A against the heirs of C to quiet
title to the land, the issue became one of whether or not C was a mort-
gagee in possession of the two tracts to which he had no deed. Held:
For the heirs of A. It is a general rule that there can be only one f ore-
closure of a mortgage or deed of trust. When a mortgagee or a trustee
under a deed of trust elects to sell only a portion of the pledged property
to satisfy the debt, the remainder of the security is released, and he can-
not thereafter assert any right to it. Therefore, C was not and could not
have been a mortgagee in possession after the execution and delivery of
the deed made pursuant to the foreclosure sale held in 1926.1
The rule against successive foreclosures of the mortgage security has
been widely applied where a decree is sought in a court of equity, 2 on
the theory that a mortgage represents but a single security and therefore
but a single cause of action, which cannot be split. Therefore, the fore-
closure cannot be piecemeal. The basic idea of not splitting the mort-
gagee's cause of action has, in several states, been enacted into statutes
which set out that "there shall be but one single action for the enforce-
"' Judge Clark, dissenting in Lewis v. Vendome Bags, Inc., 108 F. 2d 16, 20(C. C. A. 2d 1939).
1 Layden v. Layden, 228 N. C. 5, 44 S. E. 2d 340 (1947).2 Dumont v. Taylor, 67 Kan. 727, 74 Pac. 234 (1903) (mortagee got one decree
and order of sale, but withdrew it; second foreclosure refused) ; Hanson v. Dunton
35 Minn. 189, 28 N. W. 221 (1886) (mortagee had foreclosed once for part of
the debt, sought a second foreclosure for the remainder) ; Long v. W. P. Devereux
Co., 87 Mont. 209, 286 Pac. 406 (1930) (no second foreclosure on wheat grown
on mortgaged land, where mortgagee had failed to assert his right to the wheat
in the first foreclosure by having a receiver appointed) ; Nebraska .oan and Trust
Co. v. Damon, 4 Neb. (unof.) 334, 93 N. W. 1022 (1903) (foreclosure of mortgage
for interest only, where whole debt is due, exhausts lien) ; Dooly v. Eastman, 28
Wash. 564, 68 Pac. 1039 (1902).
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ment of any right secured by a mortgage."3  Indeed, the problem of
successive foreclosures is but one of many which the "one single action"
theory raises.4
To say, absolutely, that a mortgagee may foreclose but one time in
any situation would be a harsh rule, and strictly applied, a trap for many
an unwary mortgagee. As a result, courts of, equity, in their decrees,
have made several provisions for his benefit. As might be suspected,
where it is a procedural impossibility to foreclose in one suit, a second
suit is not barred.5 Likewise, where, inadvertently, all parties having
an interest in the property are not joined the first time, a second forer
closure may be had on the interest of the omitted party.6
The rest of the cases fall into two general groups-(1) where the
debt has matured only in part and (2) where the debt has matured in
whole. The first concerns the situation which arises where the mort-
gage secures a debt which falls due in successive installments, and the
mortgage contains no acceleration clause. If a foreclosure decree is had
for a part of the debt due (i.e., upon default of an installment where
other installments have yet to mature), the property is discharged from
the lien of the mortgage, and the mortgagee cannot foreclose again when
the subsequent installments are not paid 7 To save this situation, equity
courts will treat as incorporated into the decree a provision for the pres-
ervation of the lien, enabling the mortgagee to sell later under the same
decree other parcels of land to satisfy subsequent installments.8  Or, if
the property is not readily divisible, the whole may be sold, and the
court will direct that the sale be subject to a lien for the unmatured
portion of the debt ;" or, will direct that the whole security be sold, and
after the due portion of the debt is paid, that the surplus be applied to
the unmatured installments; or, will direct that the surplus be invested
until such installments become due.' 0 Accordingly, though there is a
'CALIF. CODE CIV. PRoC. (Deering, 1941) §726; IDAHO LAWS ANN. (1943)
§9-101; MONT. REv. CODES (Anderson and McFarlane, 1935) §9567; NEv. ComP.
LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) §9048; UTAH CODE ANN. (1943) §104-55.1.
'1 GLENN, MORTGAGES §96 (1st ed. 1943).
'Widman v. Hammack, 110 Wash. 77, 187 Pac. 1091 (1920) (land in two dif-
ferent states).
' Brackett v. Barnegas, 116 Cal. 278, 48 Pac. 90 (1897) (mortgage foreclosed
without making wife a party where homestead had been previously declared);
Chrystal River Lumber Co. v. Knight Turpentine Co., 69 Fla. 288, 67 So. 974
(1915) (holders of contract rights to timber on land not made parties) ; McCague
v. Eller, 77 Neb. 531, 110 N. W. 318 (1906) (equity of redemption left in part of
the premises in heirs at law of mortgagor).
Curtis v. Cutler, 76 Fed. 16 (C. C. A. 8th 1896); Cadd v. Snell, 219 Iowa
728, 259 N. W. 590 (1935).
'Black v. Reno, 59 Fed. 917 (C. C. Mo. 1894).
' Light v. Federal Land Bank of St. Louis, 177 Ark. 846, 7 S. W. 2d 975
(1928) ; Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Prendergast, 335 Ill. 646, 167 N. E. 769
(1929).
"See Black v. Reno, 59 Fed. 917 (C. C. Mo. 1894).
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rule against partial foreclosure, proper steps in equity may preserve the
lien of the mortgage."
In several states these principles have been incorporated into statutes
which are expressly designed to save the mortgage lien from extinction
when foreclosure is made on one installment of an obligation. 12
Where the whole debt is due, there are no piecemeal foreclosure
provisions in favor of the mortgagee, unless there exists some special
equity in his favor.13 He has his opportunity then and there to realize
on all of his security. If he forecloses on only a portion of a divisible
security for the whole of the debt, then the partial foreclosure rule bars
him from a second action.14
In the subject case, the court found no reason why the rule should
not be applied to a power of sale in a deed of trust. The .extension
seems a legally logical one. Foreclosure by decree in equity and by
advertisement under a power of sale, though different in method, are
similar in principle. The mortgage still represents a single security which
should not be foreclosed piecemeal, whether the foreclosure be inside
the court or out. Moreover, one purpose of the rule is to prevent the
harassment of the debtor by continued sales, and a power of sale,. not
being exercised under the guidance of the court, is more capable of
being so used.
In other states where the power of sale is frequently used, the ap-
plication of the rule has been recognized, 15 and statutes have been passed
to protect the lien of the mortgage where the debt matures in install-
ments.1
6
North Carolina has no statute protecting any piecemeal foreclosure. 17
112 WILTsiE, MORTGAGE FOREcLosuRE §832 (5th ed. Fribourg, Elting and Fri-
bourg, 1939).
" ARiz CODE (1939) §21-1226; IDAHO LAWS ANN. (1943) §9-103; MICH. STAT.
ANN. (Henderson, 1935) §27-1145 through 1148; MINN. STAT. (Henderson, 1941)
§580.09; MONT. REv. CODES (Anderson and McFarlane, 1935) §9469; NEv. ComP.
LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) §9050; N. J. STAT. ANN. (1939) §2:65046 through 65058;
N. D. REv. CODE (1943) §32-1915; N. Y. CIv. PRAC. Acr §1086; S. D. CODE (1939)
§37:2909; UTAH CODE ANN. (1943) §104-55-5; WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. (Rem-
ington, 1931) §1127; Wisc. STAT. (Brossard, 1943) §278:06.
13 Gerig v. Loveland, 130 Cal. 512, 62 Pac. 830 (1900) ; Berrie, Sheriff v. Smith,
97 Ga. 782, 25 S. E. 757 (1896) ; Swift and Co. v. First National Bank of Barnes-
yille, 161 Ga. 547, 132'S. E. 99 (1926) ; Herzog v. Union Debenture Co., 94 Neb.
820, 144 N. W. 814 (1913).
" Long v. W. P. Devereux Co., 87 Mont. 209, 286 Pac. 406 (1930).
"Walton v. Hollywood, 47 Mich. 385, 11 N. W. 209 (1882) (no second fore-
closure for taxes and insurance premiums paid subsequent to foreclosure under
power of sale).1 MIcH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1935) §27. 1222, applied in Bridgman v.
Johnson, 44 Mich. 491, 7 N. W. 83 (1880); MINN. STAT. (Henderson, 1941)§580.09; N. D. REv. CODE (1943) §35-2205; S. D. CODE (1939) §37:3003; Wisc.
STAT. (Brossard, 1943) § 297:03 (if the mortgage be payable by installments,
each installment after the first is deemed to be secured by a separate mortgage
and foreclosure may be had for each installment as if a separate mortgage had
been given for each).
1 But see in this connection N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §45-27 (sale of land
where land consists of two separate tracts lying wholly in different counties).
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This creates a problem from the standpoint of both the debtor and the
creditor where the land is divisible into parcels and foreclosure is made
under a power of sale. The mortgagee, when only part, of his debt is
matured, must sell the whole security subject to a lien for the remainder
of the debt. There is no equitable decree to provide for saving the lien,
so that he may sell in parcels as the debt matures. Moreover, when he
sells, whether only part or all of the debt is due, he must be sure that
he sells enough of the land to make him whole. He has no. second op-
portunity to foreclose if the first foreclosure does not provide enough.
From the viewpoint of the mortgagor, the rule designated to aid
him becomes a detriment where he has pledged land grossly in excess
of the amount of his debt. The mortgagee will sell all of the security,.or
at least substantially more than is necessary, in order to protect himself,
regardless of whether the mortgagor would rather have the surplus
land-than the surplus from the proceeds of the sale.
For those who want to avoid the problem so raised, the, simplest
method seems a provision in the mortgage contract providing for a
continuing power of sale authorizing the mortgagee to sell the mortgaged
property in parcels from time to time until the whole debt is satisfied;
but directing that only so much, of the property be sold as is necessary
to satisfy the debt then due. The court, in the instant case, indicated
the propriety of such a clause.' 8
As has been pointed out, many states protect the lien of the mortgage
where the debt matures in installments. Alabama, evidently feeling that
the rule against partial foreclosure should not apply to the sale of land
in parcels whether the debt had matured in part or in whole, has made
such a clause statutory. The statute sets out that foreclosure, either by
power of sale or in equity, shall operate as foreclosure only as to the
property sold, and provides that every power of sale contained in a
mortgage shall be a continuing power of sale unless it is expressly pro-
vided otherwise. 19
The need for such a statute in North Carolina must be determined
by a balancing of the respective interests of the mortgagor and the mort-
gagee. Since the rule against partial foreclosure may operate to the
detriment of the mortgagor where the land is divisible, and is a detri-
18Layden v. Layden, 228 N. C. 5, 8, 44 S. E. 2d 340, 342 (1947).
19 ALA. CoDE (1940) tit. 47, §169: "The sale of any part of the property con-
veyed by mortgage, either under power of sale contained in the mortgage or by
foreclosure in a court of equity, shall operate as a foreclosure of the mortgage
only as to the property sold, and if the mortgage indebtedness is not thereby
settled in full, the other property contained in the mortgage continues as security
for the mortgage debt and there may be a further foreclosure of the mortgage,
either by sale under power of sale or in equity. Every power of sale contained in
the mortgages hereafter executed shall, unless otherwise expressly provided therein,
be held to give a continuing power of sale authorizing the mortgagee or his assignee
after the law day of the mortgage to sell the mortgaged property from time to
time in separate lots or parcels as it comes into his possession."
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ment in any event to the mortgagee, it is submitted that a statute in the
nature of the one in Alabama would best serve the interests of both. It
should include, in addition, a clause providing that only so much property
should be sold as is necessary to satisfy the debt then due. Under such
a statute partial foreclosure would then operate to cut off the lien of
the mortgage in one case: that is, where only a portion of the debt had
matured and the-mortgagee foreclosed on the whole property without
preserving the lien.
LEImUEL H. GiBBONS
Workmen's Compensation-Falls Due to Dizzinessf Vertigo,
Epilepsy and Like Causes
It was recently held by the Georgia Court of Appeals that a fractured
skull sustained by a department store salesman, when he suffered an
epileptic attack and fell against a sharp cornered table, was an accident
arising out o.f the employment. The State Board of Workmen's Com-
pensation granted the award on a finding that the exertion of the work
brought on the attack.1 Without rejecting the finding of the Board, the
Court rather ambitiously advanced an entirely different theory. It was
said that irrespective of whether the exertion taused the attack, the in-
jury was compensable, since the table which claimant struck constituted
a "special hazard" of the employment.2 That anything so common-
place as a table should be denominated a "special hazard" and made the
basis of liability for an injury may shock those employers who are not
aware of some of the recent trends in workmen's compensation.
The Georgia statutes8 do not make the employer liable for every
accident which happens while the worker is on the job, but require the
employment in some manner contribute to the injury. In theory, at
1 The finding of exertion was not based on any immediate act, instead the whole
nature of the employment was examined, which included climbing stairs and stand-
ing for a ten-hour work day.
Note that North Carolina apparently requires some particular act of exertion
beyond the usual requirements of the employment. Neely v. Statesville, 212 N. C.
365, 193 S. E. 664 (1937) ; Moore v. Engineering & Sales Co., 214 N. C. 424, 199
S. E. 605 (1938) ; For annotations of N. C. Industrial Comnmission decisions, see
N. C. W. C. A. Ann. (1946) p. 25-26. But see Edwards v. Piedmont Publishing
Co., 227 N. C. 184, 187, 41 S. E. 2d 592, 594 (1947) (concurring opinion).
'United States Casualty Co. v. Richardson, - Ga. App. -, 43 S. E. 2d 793
(1947). Compare language of same court twelve years before where workman
fainted and fell at water fountain. The decision was found not to be in "conflict
with the main case. "The better and more generally followed rule would seem to
be that followed by Judge Stanley of the Department of Industrial Relations, to
the effect that an injury arising from a physical seizure not induced by or related
to the employment is not such an accident as would afford compensation, even
though it might appear that the particular consequences of the seizure were such
as would not have resulted elsewhere than at the place of the employment." Bibb
Mfg. Co. v. Alford, 51 Ga. App. 277, 179 S. E. 912, 914 (1935).
' GA. CODE ANN. (Park, 1937) §114-102 (1935). "'Injury' and 'personal in-jury' shall mean only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the
employment...."
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least, this contributing factor must be one peculiar to the employment
and not common to the general public. 4 The courts, torn between a
desire to construe the statute liberally in favor of the employee, and at
the same time bedeviled with common law notions of proximate cause,
have not always reached uniform nor logical decisions.
In early cases where an -employee's fall was brought on solely by a
personal disease,5 compensation was granted only when the employment
required the worker to be in such a position or location that any fall
would result in almost certain injury. This "location doctrine" seems
to stem from an English case -where an epileptic fell into a hatchway
near which his employment required him to stand.0 The case was fol-
lowed in American courts where a painter became dizzy and fell eleven
feet from a scaffold,7 where a factory worker fell into a nearby machine
from a heart attack, 8 and where an epileptic fell into a pit of hot ashes.9
The "special hazard" of these situations was apparent. However, some
American courts took the view that although the distance one fell or
the object one fell against might increase the injury, it did not change
the liability for a fall caused by a personal condition of the employee.o
The courts which accepted the "location doctrine," rationalized that the
fall itself constituted an accident and was the immediate proximate cause
of the injuries. If the employment in any manner increased the risk or
contributed to the injury, then the original cause of the fall, i.e., the
physical condition of the employee, was too remote for the court to
consider.." Simply put, the difference in the two theories seems to be,
"But it excludes an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment
as a contributing proximate cause, and comes frbm a hazard to which the work-
men would have been equally exposed apart from the employment. The causative
danger must be peculiar to the work, and not common to the neighborhood." Lib-
erty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Neal, 55 Ga. App. 790, 191 S. E. 393, 399 (1937).
'To be distinguished are cases where the employee falls from some known
cause connected with the employment, and not from a personal condition. In
such cases, compensation is almost universally given. Horovitz, Current Trends
in Workmen's Compensation, 12 LAW SocIr JOURNAL 611, 649 (1947).
8Wiks v. Dowell & Co., 2 K. B. 225 (1905); Accord, Wilson v. Chatterton,
K. B. 360 (1946) (Agriculture worker had epileptic fit, fell into furrow half full
of water and drowned). Contra: Butler v. Burton-on-Trent Union, 106 L. T. N. S.
824, 5 B. W. C. C. 355 (1912) (where employee suffering from tuberculosis, in
fit of coughing fell down stairways).
7 Gonier v. Chase Companies, 97 Conn. 46, 115 At. 677 (1921).
'Dow's Case, 231'Mass. 348, 121 N. E. 19 (1918).
" Rockford Hotel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 300 Ill. 87, 132 N. E. 759(1921). For annotations of many cases see: 19 A. L. R. 95; 28 A. L. R. 204;
60 A. L. R. 1299; 5 ScaNmDER, WonxmaN's COMPENSATION TmXT §1376 (3d ed.
1946) ; Horovitz, Current Trends in Workmen's Compensation, 12 LAw SociETr
JouNAL. 611, 649 (1947).
"
0Cox v. Kansas City Refining Co., 108 Kan. 320, 195 Pac. 863, 19 A. L. R. 90
(1921) (epileptic fell on hot pipes) ; Van Gorder v. Packard Motor Car Co., 195.
Mich. 588, 163 N. W. 107 (1917) (epileptic fell off scaffold) ; Brooker v. Indus-
trial Commission, 176 Cal. 275, 168 Pac. 126 (1917) (epileptic fell thirty-nine feet
off scaffold).
"' See note 9 supra.
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that in the former the court isolates the reason for the fall and looks
solely to the injury, while in the latter, the court examines only the
factors producing the fall and ignores the injury. Obviously, the cor-
rect rule depends on the particular fact situation. If the employment
truly creates a "special hazard" which enhances the injuries, an award
of compensation is proper. The great majority of courts today hold
that falls from purely personal physical conditions are compensable if
from a height, on a stairway, or against any object.12  But what of a
fall to the bare floor,'3 or against some objects found in every home?
How then, can the fall. be said to be an "accident arising out of the
employment"? Perhaps the only answer is in the often repeated state-
ment "that this, is an act for the giving and not the withholding of
compensation."' 4 But with only this guide the decisions are likely to
go .to ridiculous lengths. The court which finds that a concrete floor is
more apt, to cause an injury than one of wood, will soon be called on to
determine that oak is harder than pine, that pine is harder than rubber
and ad absurdum. Unfortunately, many courts continue to give lip
service to the term, "special hazard" and find in these situations that
except for the employment the particular consequences of the accident
would not have occurred. New terms such as "contributing cause" 1'
and "concurring cause"' 6 have flourished but have added little to the
formulation of a clear test.
Some courts have revised their definitions of "arising out of' to in-
clude not just "special hazards" of the employment, but also risks which
are common to the general public, and which in hindsight can be said
to have contributed to the injury.'7 But once the test of "special haz-
ard" is abandoned, the courts are in effect striking from the statutes the
phrase "arising out of." While such a step would no doubt eliminate
"
2National Automobile & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,
75 Cal. App. 2d 677, 171 P. 2d 594 (1946) (epileptic fell against sawhorse--court
in reviewing many cases said overwhelming majority favor compensation where
the injury is contributed to by some factor peculiar to the employment, even though
the fall has its origin in some idiopathy of the employee) ; Connelly v. Samaritan
Hospital, 259 N. Y. 137, 181 N. E. 76 (1932) (fall against a laundry table due to
cardiac condition) ; Tavey v. Industrial Commission, 106 Utah 479, 150 P. 2d 379
(1944) (fainted and fell against bookshelf). For annotations of recent cases, see
5 SCHNEIDER, WORKM.EN'S COMPENSATION TEXT §1376 (3d ed. 1946).
" National Automobile & Casualty Ins.'Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,
75 Cal. App. 2d 677, 171 P. 2d 594 (1946) (court says states are about evenly
divided where fall is to bare floor).
24 62 L. Q. REv. 300, 301 (1946).
" Reynolds v. Passaic Valley Sewerage Commission, 130 N. J. L. 437, 33 A.
2d 595 (1943), aft'd, 131 N. 3. L. 327, 36 A. 2d 429 (1944).
4 Connelly v. Samaritan Hospital, 259 N. Y. 137, 181 N. E. 76 (1932).
Saag v. St. Arden's Church, 122 Conn. 343, 350, 189 Adl. 599, 601 (1937);
Connelly v. Samaritan Hospital, 259 N. Y. 137, 181 N. E. 76 (1932) ; accord,
Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 62 Ariz. 398, 409; 158 P. 2d
511, 516 (1945). Sce Burroughs Adding Machine Co. v. Dehn, 110 Ind. App. 483,
493, 39 N. E. 2d 499, 507 (1942).
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much litigation, it would make the employer the insurer of his employees
subject to falls from idiopathic conditions. Any fall, while on the
job, resulting in injury would be compensable. Without concern as to
whether the Workmen's Compensation Statute' should be so extended,
it seems clear that the matter should be left to the legislatures and not
to the courts.
The marked trend towards greater liberality in this field is particu-
larly noticeable from an examination of the decisions of the North
Carolina Industrial Commission over the last fifteen years. In 1931,
when a filling station employee had a convulsion and fell into a showcase,
the Commission found the resulting injuries did not arise out of a risk
incident to the employment.' 8 Similar results were reached when
workers fell due to faintihg,19 cerebral hemorrhages, 20 and dizziness.21
In 1935, however, compensation was allowed where a worker became
dizzy and fell from a roof.22 And in 1940, the Commission clarified
their position by stating that when the employment subjects the worker
to especial danger from falls, injuries received thereby are compensable,
"irrespective of whether or not the condition of the employee, which
originally set in motion the dangerous hazard of the employment was
foreign or connected with his employment. ' 23  The gamut was com-
pleted in 1946 when the Commission said it was immaterial whether an
epileptic seizure caused a worker to fall backwards on a cement floor,
since the cement constituted a "special hazard" and a greater risk thdn
the worker would have been subjected. to outside the employment.24
It is not entirely clear just -where the North Carolina Supreme Court
stands in this controversial field in the absence of a decision directly
in point. When a fire chief, during a fire, collapsed on a stairway from
a heart attack, compensation was denied since the court could find no
accident. 25 But when a millworker fell backwards from some unde-
termined cause, compensation was allowed. It was pointed out that
when the cause of a fall is unknown it is presumptive that it arose out
of the employment. 26 In a dictum the court distinguished cases where
the fall was due to a physical infirmity or some other force external to
" Boyette v. Thompson-Wooten Oil Co., 2 I. C. 378 (1938).
" Beam v. Presbyterian Hospital, 4995 (1935) N. C. W. C. A. Ann. (1946)
p. 24.2 Kirkman v. Greensboro, 8530 (1939) N. C. W. C. A. Ann. (1946) p. 24.
"
1 Cooke v. Roanoke Mills Co. No. 2, A-1288 (1942) N. C. W. C. A. Ann.
(1946) p. 24.
"'Garland v. Bordner & Co., 4809 (1935) N. C. W. C. A. Ann. (1946) p. 24.
" Howard v. J. L. Miller, 9324 (1940) N. C. W. C. A. Ann. (1946) p. 24.2 Record, p. 61, Devine v. Dave Steel Co., 227 N. C. 684, 44 S. E. 2d 77
(1947).
"' Neely v. Statesville, 212 N. C. 365, 193 S. E. 664 (1937) (evidence that death
was due to the heart attack instead of the fall).
" Robbins v. Bossong Hosiery Mills, 220 N. C. 246, 17 S. E. 2d 20 (1941).
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the employment.27 In 1946, the court handed down a decision which
appears to overrule that dictum; in fact the Georgia court in the prin-
cipal case cited the North Carolina decision as supporting the theory
of compensation for a fall irrespective of its cause if the employment
enhances the injuries. In that case an employee, suffering from a dis-
ease which caused fainting, fell from the window of a washroom on the
eleventh floor of an office building. While there was at least strong
circumstantial evidence that the deceased fainted, the hearing commis-
sion found as a fact, based on investigations conducted ten months later,
thaf in an effort to get air at the open window, the deceased slipped on
the "very slick tile floor" which constituted a "special hazard." On
appeal the court treated this as a case of first impression.and favorably
reviewed cases from other jurisdictions where compensation had been
granted for falls due to idiopathic diseases.28 But it should be noted
these cases are distinguishable in light of the findings of the commission.
Here, the slippery floor, not the disease, caused the fall and compensa-
tion could have been granted by virtue of the "special hazard." 20 Unless
one is to believe that the court was dissatisfied with the finding of.facts
of the commission and felt that the fall was actually the results of
fainting, it is difficult to see why the court relied on a line of decisions
to. support. that point.
A 1947 decision has failed to throw any light on the position of the
North Carolina Supreme Court.' In this case a watchman, while lower-
ing a flag, fell backwards onto the cement on which he was standing,
and received a fractured skull from which he never regained conscious-
ness. Although there was evidence that deceased suffered from epilepsy,
the commission rejected any inference that this fall was the results of
an epileptic attack. Instead the cause of the fall was left undetermined,
but the-commission found death arose out of the employment because
deceased was required to stand-on cement.30 The court, without adopt-
ing all of the reasons assigned by the commission, affirmed the award.31
Since the cause of the fall was unexplained the court was not called on
27 "If, however the cause is known and is independent of, unrelated to, and
apart from the employment-the results of a hazard to which others are equally
exposed-compensation will not be allowed." Robbins v. Bossong Hosiery Mills,
220 N. C. 246, 248, 17 S. E. 2d 20, 22 (1941).
"Rewis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 226 N. C. 325, 38 S. E. 2d 197 (1946).
"EHowell v. Standard Ice & Fuel Co., 226 N. C. 730, 40 S. E. 2d 197 (1946)
(fell from trestle); Brown v. Carolina Aluminum Co., 224 N. C. 766, 32 S. E.
2d 320 (1944) (pushed backward on cement floor by fellow worker) ; Gorden v.
Thomasville Chair Co., 205 N. C. 739, 172 S. E. 485 (1934) (slipped on ice);
Clark v. Carolina Cotton & Woolen Mills, 204 N. C. 529, 168 S. E. 816 (1933)
(slipped on stairway).
:8 Record, p. 37, Devine v. Dave Steel Co., 227 N. C. 684, 44 S. E. 2d 77
(1947) (There was expert medical testimony that a fall onto concrete is more
likely to produce a fractured skull than one onto dirt.).3 Devine v. Dave Steel Co., 227 N. C. 684, 44 S. E. 2d 77 (1947).
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to decide the effect of a fall which resulted from a condition personal
to the employee.3 2
However, one gathers. from the tenor of these decisions that the
court is willing to go along with a liberal interpretation of the Work-
men's Compensation Act. Until an employee survives his fall and gives
direct testimony as to the cause, leaving no room for favorable pre-
sumptions or fact finding based on circumstantial evidence, we can only
guess as to *the real position of the court. But if one can rely on dicta
and the overall trend toward liberality, it seems probable that any fall
resulting in injuries will be compensable in the future. It will be in-
teresting to see how long the court can reconcile such awards with their
traditional requirement that for injury to arise out of the employment it
must be by a peculiar risk, uncommon to the general public. 3 Liability
without fault has become generally accepted, but it now appears em-
ployers are facing liability without practical means of avoidance.8 4
Some employers may find the only alternative to upholstering their
entire premises will be to refuse to hire those suffering from physical
infirmities.8 5
GEoRGE M. McDERmoTT,.JR.
"Robbins v. Bossong Hosiery Mills, 220 N. C. 246, 17 S. E. 2d 20 (1941).
"Bryant v. T. A. Loving Co., 222 N. C. 724, 24 S. E. 2d 751 (1943) ; Lockey
v. Cohen, Goldman & Co., 213 N. C. 356, 196 S. E. 342 (1938); Pleminons v.
White's Service Inc., 213 N. C. 148, 195 S. E. 370 (1938).
"Much the same trend has occurred where the injury is on the street or by
act of God. "The street hazard constitutes a well-recognized relaxation of this
rule: If an employee has been sent out on the streets and sustains an injury there,
he can recover compensation, although, he was exposed to no more danger than
the general public on the streets at the time." Note, 20 TEx L. REV. 387, 388
(1942); See Note, 23 N. C. L. REv. 159 -(1945). For examples of injury by
act of God, see Caswell's Case, 305 Mass. 500, 26 N. E. 2d 328 (1940) (when
hurricane caused wall of factory to fall on employee, compensation allowed even
though it was conceded that, by remaining in the brick building, employee was
subjected to less hazard than he would have been at home). For recent cases see
Horovitz, Current Trends in Workinens Compensation, 12 LAw SOCIETY JOU.NAL
466, 511 (1947).
" 42 Science N. L. 307 (1942) (It is estimated that there are 350,000 epileptics
in the United States, two thirds of whom are capable of doing useful work, but
can't get jobs because many employers fear they will be made liable for the con-
sequences of an attack while on the job. It is estimated that more than 15% of
the brain injuries of the last war, will result in epilepsy.).
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